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A Union of Amateurs: A Legal Blueprint to
Reshape Big-Time College Athletics
NICHOLAS FRAMt
T. WARD FRAMPTONtt
INTRODUCTION
"March Madness" is the culmination of the National
Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") Division I
basketball season, a carefully stage-managed tournament
showcasing the country's most talented college athletes. The
spectacle is extraordinarily lucrative for many of those
involved: in 2010, CBS and Turner Broadcasting paid the
NCAA $10.8 billion for the rights to broadcast the event for
the next fourteen years,' and advertisers pay networks
$1.22 million for a thirty-second opportunity to sell their
products during the final game.2 Each victory during the
tournament earns schools and their coconference members
approximately $1.5 million from the NCAA,3 and coaches'
contracts regularly include six-figure performance bonuses
rewarding tournament victories.' At the center of it all, of
t J.D., University of California, Berkeley, School of Law; M.A., Stanford
University, 2007; Clerk to the Hon. George B. Daniels, Southern District of New
York, 2012-2013 Term.
ft J.D., University of California, Berkeley, School of Law; M.A., Yale
University, 2006; Clerk to the Hon. Diane P. Wood, United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 2012-2013 Term.
1. Brad Wolverton, NCAA Agrees to $10.8-Billion Deal to Broadcast Its
Men's Basketball Tournament, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 22, 2010),
http://www.chronicle.com/article/NCAA-signs-108-Billion-Deal/65219/.
2. Anthony Crupi, March Madness Still One of the Biggest Sports
Franchises, AD WEEK (Mar. 1, 2011), www.adweek.com/news/television/march-
madness-still-one-biggest-sports-franchises-125889.
3. NCAA, 2010-2011 REVENUE DISTRIBUTION PLAN 7-9, http://www.ncaa.org/
wps/portal (access login required).
4. Jodi Upton, Salary analysis: NCAA tournament coaches cashing in, USA
TODAY, (Mar. 30, 2011, 10:53 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/
sports/college/mensbasketball/2011-03-30-ncaa-coaches-salary-analysisN.htm.
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course, are the college athletes whose labor the NCAA
insists is "motivated primarily by education and by the
physical, mental and social benefits to be derived."' But in
the mid-1990s-in a story that remains almost entirely
untold nearly two decades later 6 -the unpaid amateurs of
March Madness nearly brought the entire production to a
halt.
During the 1994-1995 season, NCAA basketball players
formulated a plan to strike moments before critical post-
season games, refusing to compete unless they received an
equitable share of the revenue their labor generated. "They
were going to get dressed, walk out on court, and refuse to
play," recalls Dr. William Friday, former president of the
University of North Carolina and then cochair of the Knight
Commission on College Athletics.7 Rumors of the potential
disruptions panicked NCAA officials and television
executives. Dr. Friday says: "You can imagine what would
happen with the television networks, with ten million
people waiting and nothing happening. . . . It would have
been chaotic."' Strike plans were "pretty concrete,"
according to former University of Massachusetts forward
Rigo Nilfiez, but interventions by coaches and other officials
thwarted the effort's momentum.' "If we had Twitter, if we
had Facebook, this would definitely have had an impact on
the NCAA tournament," Nufiez suggests, but the boycott
ultimately unraveled amidst players' fears that striking
5. NCAA, 2009-2010 DIVISION I MANUAL: CONSTITUTION, OPERATING BYLAWS,
ADMINISTRATIVE BYLAws, art.2.9 [hereinafter "NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL"].
6. The 1995 strike was mentioned publicly for the first time on an episode of
HBO'S Real Sports with Bryant Gumbel (HBO television broadcast Mar. 30,
2011); see also Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, THE ATLANTIc, Oct.
2011, at 93 (discussing the planned boycott). Recent scholarly works on college
athletics make no mention of the planned disruptions. See, e.g., CHARLES T.
CLOTFELTER, BIG-TIME SPORTS IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES (2011); RONALD A.
SMITH, PAY FOR PLAY: A HISTORY OF BIG-TIME COLLEGE ATHLETIC REFORM (2010).
7. Telephone Interview with William Friday, Founding CoChairman, The
Knight Foundation Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics (Dec. 15, 2011).
8. Id.
9. Telephone Interview with Rigo Ndfiez, former college athlete, University
of Massachusetts (Dec. 20, 2011).
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players would be "blackballed" and branded as
"troublemakers.""
Though the history is largely forgotten today, the
planned 1995 strike would not have been the first work
stoppage in big-time college athletics. In 1936, in a story
followed closely by the black and left-wing press, the
Howard University football team struck for several games,
demanding adequate medical supplies for players,
nutritional food, and access to campus jobs." Two years
later, the Louisiana State University football team
dismissed a player after "he dared to 'agitate for a union' of
the players."" But the most high-profile disputes of the New
Deal era centered on the University of Pittsburgh's top-
ranked football program. After an undefeated 1937 season
garnered the squad a Rose Bowl invitation, players
demanded $200 in pocket money for their participation.13
When university officials balked, the players voted 17-16 to
boycott the game." The next fall, sophomores refused to
10. Dr. Friday's version of events differs somewhat from that of Mr. Niiez.
According to Dr. Friday, the strike rumors focused on one particular top-ranked
team, whose players planned to walk out upon reaching the Final Four. See
Telephone Interview with William Friday, supra note 7. Much to the relief of
NCAA officials, the team was unexpectedly ousted early in the tournament. See
Branch, supra note 6, at 93 (reporting same account). Mr. Nifiez maintains that
the high-profile athletes from over a dozen schools were discussing strike
activities in both 1995 and 1996, but that fear of retaliation ultimately
prevented the strike. See Telephone Interview with Rigo Ndfiez, supra note 9.
11. Howard Students in Football Strike, Cm. DEFENDER, Nov. 21, 1936, at 1
(noting 85% of student body participated in one-day solidarity walk-out);
Jeannette Carter, Howard-Lincoln Thanksgiving Football Classic Is Called Off:
Board Fears New Strike by Players, Cm. DEFENDER, Nov. 28, 1936, at 1.
12. MICHAEL ORIARD, KING FOOTBALL 247 (2004).
13. SMITH, supra note 6, at 79.
14. Id. This was not the only example of player agitation for bowl game
bonuses in college football. In 1940, Stanford football players (successfully)
demanded $50 per player to compete in the Rose Bowl, while in 1948, University
of Arizona players (unsuccessfully) sought a $175 pay day. And as late as 1961,
Syracuse University players refused to play in the relatively new, made-for-
television Liberty Bowl if their demands for fancy wristwatches were not met.
See DAvE MEGGYESY, OUT OF THEIR LEAGuE 87-89 (1970) ("The [Syracuse)
athletic department had never seen the ball players get together on their own
before and this, coupled with the talk of boycott, made them quickly agree to
give us watches-and before the game as we had demanded."); ORIARD, supra
note 12, at 247 (discussing Stanford and Arizona player demands).
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attend pre-season training, striking "in order to settle
'differences' with the Pitt business department."" The
thirty-odd members of the freshman squad threatened to
strike again several months later. Their demands included
four-year athletic scholarships, shorter working hours,
accommodation for class time missed due to football
obligations, and collective bargaining rights.'" The press
quipped that "all the Pitt freshmen needed to do now was to
join the CIO and turn over their demands for collective
bargaining, wages and hours and relief to John L. Lewis."l7
College athletics have changed dramatically in the
intervening years, but now, after seven decades, talk of
strikes and players unions is returning. In January 2012,
the New York Times published a detailed proposal to begin
paying college athletes, including a hypothetical "players'
union" to negotiate with the NCAA." The Chicago Sun-
Times's lead sports columnist exhorted college football
players to strike the following week: "If you don't strike,
using the time-honored American-yes, patriotic!-
technique of banding together over endless exploitation and
walking out, sitting down or disrupting the system en
masse, you will always be pawns." 9 But perhaps most
significantly, unlike in 1995, college athletes now have a
member-driven advocacy group to advance their interests,
15. Horrors! Pitt Frosh Grid Players Get Tuition Bills!, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 16,
1938, at All; Pitt Frosh 'Go Free': 'Misunderstanding' Causes Cancellation of
Gridders' Tuition, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1938, at A28.
16. Francis Wallace, The Football Laboratory Explodes: The Climax in the
Test Case at Pitt, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Nov. 4, 1939, at 21. The university's
refusal to compensate athletes soon prompted the resignation of legendary head
coach Jock Sutherland, who characterized the university's refusal to compensate
athletes as the "verse of daffodils and pink sunsets and milky moonlight and
anemic idealism." High-Pressure Football Defended By Sutherland, WASH. POST,
Apr. 12, 1939, at 19. Students rioted in protest of Sutherland's departure and
the university's refusal to compensate athletes. Pitt Students Strike; Protest
School Policy, Cm. DAILY TRIB., Mar. 11, 1939, at 21.
17. Wallace, supra note 16, at 21.
18. Joe Nocera, Here's How To Pay Up Now, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2012, at
MM33.
19. Rick Telander, A revolting development: College football players need to go
on strike and demand a piece of the lucrative pie, Cm. SuN-TIMES, Jan. 9, 2012,
at 58.
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notably with union backing.2 0 During a brief window in
October 2011, rank-and-file organizers with the National
College Players Association ("NCPA") gathered signatures
from over three hundred college football and basketball
players at five targeted schools (including the entire UCLA
football and basketball rosters) demanding that athletes
receive a greater share of revenue from the NCAA.2 1 A union
of college athletes is no longer a theoretical exercise:
cultural momentum and a nascent organizational
framework already exist.2 2
These developments add urgency to this Article's
central inquiry: would existing labor law allow such a
union? If the NCPA were to collect players' signatures on
union authorization cards rather than on protest petitions,
could players compel universities to negotiate over the
terms and conditions of their service? If school officials were
to retaliate against athletes who circulated the October
2011 petition, or against athletes who collectively withheld
their labor, could such punishment constitute an unfair
labor practice?2 3 As college athletes continue to agitate
20. See National College Players Association, NCPA & USW-A Winning
Team, http://www.ncpanow.org/ncpa usw?id=0003 (last visited June 12, 2012)
(noting collaboration between United Steelworkers and NCPA).
21. Alan Scher Zagier, College athletes press NCAA reform, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Oct. 24, 2011, available at http://rivals.yahoo.com/ncaa/football/news?
slug=txncaaathletesrights (noting campaign focused on Arizona, Georgia Tech,
Kentucky, Purdue, and UCLA).
22. Our focus for this Article, like that of the NCPA's organizing campaign, is
limited to NCAA Division I scholarship athletes in "revenue-generating sports"
(football and men's basketball). See Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian
McCormick, The Myth of the Student-Athlete: The College Athlete as Employee,
81 WASH. L. REv. 71, 72 (2006) [hereinafter "McCormick & McCormick, Myth"].
These two sports are unique in terms of the degree to which they have been
commercialized, the millions of dollars spent on such programs, and the vast
revenues that college athletes in these sports generate. See id. at 75, n.15
(discussing rationale for treating football and men's basketball differently than
other college sports). For reasons discussed in Part I.A., infra, we refer to such
individuals as "college athletes" rather than the more common moniker
"student-athlete."
23. While this Article focuses mainly on the prospects for collective
bargaining in college athletics, it is important to remember that labor law
protects all employees engaged in "concerted activity" in the workplace,
regardless of their intent to formally unionize. See NLRB v. Washington
Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 12 (1962).
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against a recalcitrant NCAA, the future of a multibillion
dollar industry hinges on these questions.
In the last twenty years, more than a half-dozen law
review articles have suggested that the National Labor
Relations Board ("Board" or "NLRB") should recognize
Division I scholarship athletes in revenue-generating sports
as "employees" under federal labor law. These scholars
emphasize that, behind the veil of amateurism, college
athletes' relationships with universities bear all the
hallmarks of classic employment. Athletes labor under the
direction and control of university coaches and officials; this
work is unconnected to (indeed, often at odds with) their
educational objective as students, and universities provide
valuable scholarships, now potentially supplemented with
up to $2000 in "stipend" payments,2 in consideration for
these prized services. Several other law review articles have
questioned whether this is sufficient to meet the statutory
definition of "employee" under the NLRA.2 6 But practically
24. See Leroy D. Clark, New Directions for the Civil Rights Movement: College
Athletics as a Civil Rights Issue, 36 HOWARD L.J. 259, 278 (1993) ("[M]uch of the
reality of college sports belies that interpretation [that student-athletes are not
'employees' under the NLRA], as it is very clear that the athletes are paid for
their services . . . ."); J. Trevor Johnston, Show Them The Money: The Threat of
NCAA Athlete Unionization in Response to the Commercialization of College
Sports, 13 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 203, 231 (2003); Amy Christian McCormick &
Robert A. McCormick, The Emperor's New Clothes: Lifting the NCAA's Veil of
Amateurism, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 495, 496-500 (2008); Robert A. McCormick &
Amy Christian McCormick, A Trail of Tears: The Exploitation of the College
Athlete, 11 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 639, 644-48 (2010); McCormick & McCormick,
Myth, supra note 22, at 155; Nathan McCoy & Kerry Knox, Flexing Union
Muscle-Is it the Right Game Plan For Revenue Generating Student-Athletes in
their Contest for Benefits Reform with the NCAA?, 69 TENN. L. REV. 1051, 1053-
54, 1077 (2002); Stephen L. Ukeiley, No Salary, No Union, No Collective
Bargaining: Scholarship Athletes Are An Employer's Dream Come True, 6 SETON
HALL J. SPORT L. 167, 172 (1996); Jonathan L.H. Nygren, Note, Forcing the
NCAA to Listen: Using Labor Law to Force the NCAA to Bargain Collectively
with Student-Athletes, 2 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 359, 371 (2003).
25. See infra Part I.C. (discussing a new NCAA rule change regarding
supplementary stipends).
26. Julia Brighton, The NCAA and the Right of Publicity: How the
O'Bannon/Keller Case May Finally Level the Playing Field, 33 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENT. L.J. 275, 286 (2011) (noting the "difficulty of characterizing student-
athletes as 'employees'"); Virginia A. Fitt, The NCAA's Lost Cause and the Legal
Ease of Redefining Amateurism, 59 DUKE L.J. 555, 573-76 (2009); Thomas R.
Hurst & J. Grier Pressly III, Payment of Student-Athletes: Legal & Practical
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the entire body of this scholarship has ignored one critical
point: the NLRA, which governs labor relations only in the
private sector,2 7 simply does not govern the majority of
college athletes at public colleges and universities. To the
extent that NCAA athletes at public institutions are
"employees," they are public employees, and state labor law
dictates whether unionization is a feasible option.2 9
This Article offers the first comprehensive analysis of
NCAA athletics under state labor law, reaching a novel and
potentially game-changing conclusion: that Division I
athletes at many top-ranked programs likely enjoy a legal
right to unionize under state law. Part I of this Article
traces the historical development of the "myth of the
student-athlete," discusses the commercial stakes of today's
big-time college athletics, and explores the economic
position of the college athlete within this regime. In Part II,
Obstacles, 7 VILL. SPORTs & ENT. L.J. 55, 70 (2000) (arguing "student-athletes do
not qualify as 'employees,'" but noting that "if the NCAA adopted the stipend
proposal [like that enacted in late 2011] . . . student-athletes would more than
likely meet the NLRA 'employee' definition ... [and enjoy] the right to unionize
and bargain collectively."); Marc Jenkins, The United Student-Athletes of
America: Should College Athletes Organize In Order To Protect Their Rights and
Address the Ills of Intercollegiate Athletics?, 5 VAND. J. ENr. L. & PRAC. 39, 46
(2002) ("Given courts' deference to the NCAA, and the following decisions in the
workers' compensation context, this argument [that student-athletes are
'employees' under the NLRA] would probably fail."); Rohith A. Parasuraman,
Unionizing NCAA Division I Athletics: A Viable Solution?, 57 DUKE L.J. 727,
739-45 (2007).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006) ("The term 'employer' ... shall not include the
United States or any wholly owned Government corporation ... or any State or
political subdivision thereof .. . .").
28. Many of the articles apparently fail to recognize this point altogether. See,
e.g., Brighton, supra note 26, at 286-88; Hurst & Pressly, supra note 26, at 70-
71; Jenkins, supra note 26, at 46, 48; Parasuraman, supra note 26, at 739-45.
Others observe in passing that state labor law governs public institutions, but
devote their analyses exclusively to the NLRA. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 24, at
278 n.53; Johnston, supra note 24, at 222-23; McCormick & McCormick, Myth,
supra note 22, at 86-89; McCoy & Knox, supra note 24, at 1053; Ukeiley, supra
note 24, at 176-77. The sole exception is Jonathan L.H. Nygren's Forcing the
NCAA to Listen, supra note 24, at 371-84, which considers college athletes'
"employee" status under both federal law and the labor law of one state-
California.
29. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (excluding employees of state and local government
from NLRA protection); Clark, supra note 24, at 278 n.53.
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we present the various tests the NLRB has articulated in
identifying "employees" entitled to statutory protection and
assess the status of college athletes under these tests. We
turn then to the varying approaches state labor boards and
courts have adopted in pursuing this same inquiry in Part
III, and explore the extent to which college athlete unions
may be possible under state law. Though some states forbid
public employees from unionizing, many endorse the
practice, and (most significantly for our purposes) several
states have shown considerable solicitude to student-
workers seeking recognition as "employees" in the public
university setting. The Article concludes in Part IV by
discussing the practical consequences of these findings, and
the theoretical difficulties implicated by reconceptualizing
college athletes as workers. Though some have argued that
recognizing athletes as "employees" would fundamentally
taint college sports,3 0 we offer a counterintuitive suggestion:
allowing college athletes to unionize may help preserve the
institution as a unique, educationally-focused alternative to
professional athletics.
In adopting this approach, this Article represents an
intervention in the existing scholarship in several
significant ways. First, as noted above, federal labor law
simply cannot apply to most big-time college athletes. Of the
sixty-six schools constituting the main six Division I Bowl
Championship Series football conferences, fifty-five are
public;31 of the fifty-six top-ranked basketball programs from
2007-2011, thirty-eight are public.3 2 For these college
athletes, federal labor law is all but irrelevant. Second,
notwithstanding language in recent opinions suggesting
30. See, e.g., Joe Nocera, Here's How to Pay Up Now, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30,
2011, at MM30 (quoting NCAA president Mark Emmert as stating "If we move
toward a pay-for-pay model-if we were to convert our student athletes to
employees of the university-that would be the death of college athletics.").
31. Six conferences-the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), Big 12, Big East,
Big Ten, Pacific-12, and Southeastern Conference (SEC)-are considered the
major BCS conferences, and each conference receives automatic berths to Bowl
Championship Series bowl games every year.
32. See Associated Press NCAA Men's Basketball Rankings, 2006-2011,
ESPN.com, http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/rankings (last visited
Apr. 4, 2012) (the sample is made up of the fifty-six basketball programs that
have appeared in the final AP "Top 25" rankings for the five seasons through
the 2011 season).
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college athletes may meet the act's statutory definition of
"employees," we remain somewhat wary of an approach that
looks to the NLRB as an avenue for advancing collective
bargaining rights. The Board has become "the flashpoint for
unprecedented contentiousness" in recent years,3 3 with even
its modest efforts to defend workers' rights incurring
virulent criticism.3 4 As numerous labor law scholars have
argued, the Board has been largely ineffective in "keep[ing]
the Act up to date"35 and "keeping pace with changes"36 to
vindicate the interests of workers in a twenty-first century
economy." Third, more generally, this Article highlights the
growing centrality of state law in American labor relations
and illustrates the divergent ways in which courts and labor
boards have interpreted state and federal statutes,
particularly with respect to student-employees." Our state-
level focus is both necessitated by and indicative of the
changing landscape of today's labor movement, which now
counts fewer union members in the private sector (governed
33. Tim Mak, It's World War III at the NLRB, POLITICO (Dec. 26, 2011, 8:57
AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1211/70856.html.
34. See Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board's Exiting Leader Responds to
Critics, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2011, at B1 (noting criticisms that the Board
embodies "Marxism on the march" and that its members are "socialist goons").
35. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification ofAmerican Labor Law, 102 COLUM.
L. REV. 1527, 1558-59 (2002).
36. Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOzo L. REV.
2685, 2686 (2008).
37. See also Henry H. Drummonds, Reforming Labor Law by Reforming
Labor Law Preemption Doctrine to Allow the States to Make More Labor
Relations Policy, 70 LA. L. REV. 97, 97 (2009) ("The road forward for labor
relations policy in the United States lies not in Washington, D.C., but in state
capitols."); Alek Felstiner, Working the Crowd: Employment and Labor Law in
the Crowdsourcing Industry, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 143, 197 (2011)
("Our gap-ridden and outdated legal regime simply does not accommodate new
labor models very well."); Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers'
Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1769, 1769
(1983) ("Contemporary American labor law more and more resembles an elegant
tombstone for a dying institution.").
38. See Benjamin I. Sachs, Labor Law Renewal, 1 HARV. L. & POL'VY REV. 375,
376 (2007) (highlighting "labor law regimels] developed by state governments"
as source of "new dynamism" in the field of labor law).
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primarily by the NLRA) than in the public sector (governed
primarily by state labor law).39
I. THE MYTH OF THE "STUDENT-ATHLETE"
A. Creation Stories
When William Rainey Harper became the first
president of the University of Chicago in 1892, among his
first (and highest paid) faculty appointments was former
All-American football standout Amos Alonzo Stagg.4 0
Intercollegiate athletic competitions had blossomed over the
past five decades,4 1 and Harper recognized that an
acclaimed football squad could be a "[d]rawing card" for the
fledgling institution.42 He charged his new coach with
"develop[ing] teams which we can send around the country
and knock out all the colleges. We will give them a palace
car and a vacation, too."43 Department chairs quipped that
Harper was "The P.T. Barnum of Higher Education,"" but
his marketing strategies worked: Chicago soon built a
nationally-renowned football program (despite allegations
39. In 2011, the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics reported
7.6 million union members in the public sector (37.0% density) compared to 7.2
million union members in the private sector (6.9% union rate). See Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Union Members Summary, Jan. 27, 2012, http://www.bls.
gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm. As a matter of political (as opposed to
scholarly) importance, state labor law's moment plainly has arrived. The pitched
battles being fought over public-sector collective bargaining in Arizona,
Wisconsin, Indiana, and several other states reflect its growing importance for
Labor (and its critics).
40. Hal A. Lawson & Alan G. Ingham, Conflicting Ideologies Concerning the
University and Intercollegiate Athletics: Harper and Hutchins at Chicago, 1892-
1940, 7 J. SPORT HIST. 37, 42, 44 (1980).
41. The first recorded intercollegiate competition is generally thought to be a
crew meet between Harvard and Yale in 1852. ALLEN L. SACK & ELLEN J.
STAUROWSKY, COLLEGE ATHLETES FOR HIRE: THE EVOLUTION AND LEGACY OF THE
NCAA's AMATEuR MYTH 17 (1998).
42. Lawson & Ingham, supra note 40, at 41.
43. Id. at 42.
44. Id. at 41.
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that Stagg was "employing professional athletes"), and
enrollment tripled to 5500 by 1909.45
Amidst public outcry over the increasingly brutal
nature of college football-at least twenty players were
killed during the 1904 season4-sixty-two colleges met in
1905 to form what would become the National Collegiate
Athletics Association.4 7 From the outset, the NCAA
promoted an ethos of strict amateurism, including a ban on
all forms of monetary incentives like athletic scholarships.4 8
But for the first fifty years of its existence, the organization
lacked meaningful mechanisms to enforce its principles.4 9 In
a major survey conducted by the Carnegie Foundation in
1929, 81 of 112 schools openly admitted violating NCAA
policy, "ranging from open payrolls and disguised booster
funds to no-show jobs [for athletes] at movie studios."" With
member institutions hungry to satisfy the burgeoning
commercial market for college sports, "[t]he NCAA's
amateur code, like the Eighteenth Amendment, proved
almost impossible to enforce.""
By the late 1950s, the NCAA had abandoned a central
tenet of its original amateur ideal: universities would now
be allowed to pay for promising athletes' tuition, housing,
and other living expenses, regardless of academic
distinction or economic need." Such payments to students
were already commonplace, of course, but the NCAA hoped
45. Id. at 39, 44. Notre Dame's surprise victory over Army in 1913 similarly
launched the school, then a "relatively unknown MVidwestern college," into the
national spotlight. SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 41, at 151 n. 1. "Notre Dame
became the center of pride for millions of ethnic Americans for whom a Notre
Dame victory over Yale or Harvard was a symbolic victory of working people
over their bosses." Id.
46. SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 41, at 32.
47. Id. at 33.
48. Id. (citing INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST ANNUAL CONVENTION 33 (1906)).
49. TAYLOR BRANCH, THE CARTEL 20 (2011). Pulitzer Prize-winner Taylor
Branch's biting expose of the NCAA, The Shame of College Sports, appeared in
THE ATLANTIC magazine in October 2011. A slightly longer version of this piece
was published in book form as THE CARTEL shortly thereafter.
50. Id. at 21-22.
51. SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 41, at 35.
52. See id. at 47.
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formal recognition would sanitize the practice and curb its
excesses." In affixing its imprimatur to the payment of
athletic scholarships, however, the NCAA was also
positioning itself to guide the explosive economic growth of
college athletics that would come in subsequent years. As
Professors Sack and Staurowsky explain, highly
commercialized college athletics require both a pool of high-
caliber athletes and a regulated distribution mechanism for
spreading this talent between competing schools.54 The
NCAA's 1950s reforms "rationalize [d] the recruitment,
distribution, and subsidization of player talent ... [laying]
the foundation for today's corporate college sport."
Awarding tuition payments on the basis of athletic talent,
once anathema to concept of amateurism, became the
centerpiece of professionalized college athletics.
But while the NCAA reluctantly embraced this new
vision of "amateurism," the courts initially balked, finding it
a fagade for an underlying employer-employee relationship.
In two cases in 1953 and 1963, state courts held that
scholarship students, injured or killed in the course of their
athletic duties, were actually university "employees" for
workers' compensation purposes.5 6 Recognizing that
"[hi i'her education in this day is a business, and a big
one," the courts found that an injured athlete could have
"the dual capacity of student and employee. . . . The form of
remuneration is immaterial.""
Shaken by the prospect that courts might recognize
college athletes as "employees," the NCAA invented the now
53. See id.
54. See id. at 49.
55. Id.
56. See Van Horn v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169, 172 (Ct. App.
1963) (holding decedent scholarship athlete eligible for benefits, as he
"participated in the college football program under a contract of employment
with the college"); Univ. of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423, 426 (Colo. 1953) ("A
student employed by the University to discharge certain duties, not a part of his
education program, is no different than the employee who is taking no course of
instruction so far as the Workmen's Compensation Act is concerned."); see also
Scholarship Player an Employe, Coast Compensation Unit Rules, N.Y. TiMEs,
Nov. 1, 1963, at 18 (discussing the Van Horn case).
57. Nemeth, 257 P.2d at 425-26.
58. Van Horn, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 173-74.
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ubiquitous watchword "student-athlete" as a direct response
to these legal defeats.5 9 Walter Byers, who served as the
NCAA's influential executive director from 1951 to 1987,
recounts in his memoir the panic such cases provoked. The
workers' compensation cases raised the:
dreaded notion that NCAA athletes could be identified as
employees by state industrial commissions and the courts. . . . We
crafted the term student-athlete, and soon it was embedded in all
NCAA rules and interpretations as a mandated substitute for
such words as players and athletes ... 60
The term "student-athlete" was designed not only to
"conjure the nobility of amateurism, and the precedence of
scholarship over athletic endeavor," but to obfuscate the
nature of the legal relationship at the heart of a growing
* 61commercial enterprise.
It worked. Since the 1960s, the NCAA has repeatedly
prevailed in workers' compensation claims brought by
severely injured college athletes.62 Likewise in the antitrust
context, courts have afforded the NCAA considerable
deference, accepting NCAA practices as necessary "to
preserve the unique atmosphere of competition between
'student-athletes."' 3 "Even in the increasingly commercial
59. See WALTER BYERS WITH CHARLES HAMMER, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT:
EXPLOITING COLLEGE ATHLETES 69 (1995).
60. See id. This mandate apparently still remains in effect today. An author
search for the term "student athlete" on the NCAA website, www.ncaa.org,
yielded 8950 results. By contrast, the term "player" appears less than a third as
many times, and the term "employee" only 232 times, and never in reference to
a "student athlete."
61. BRANCH, supra note 49, at 33-35.
62. See Frank P. Tiscione, College Athletics and Workers' Compensation: Why
the Courts Get It Wrong in Denying Student-Athletes Workers' Compensation
Benefits When They Get Injured, 14 SPORTS L.J. 137, 144-51 (2007) (describing
the early case law that considered athletes employees and the subsequent
reversal). Note that these decisions concerning the "employee" status of college
athletes in such cases necessarily hinge on the definitions of that term in the
relevant states' workers' compensation statutes. This determination does not
control the "employee" status of college athletes for other legal purposes,
including collective bargaining, for which there are discrete statutory definitions
and relevant case law.
63. Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 740, 744, 748 (M.D. Tenn. 1990)
(upholding NCAA eligibility rules barring individuals who "enter[ed] a
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modern world," a federal district judge explained in 1990,
"there is still validity to the Athenian concept of a complete
education derived from fostering full growth of both mind
and body."' The notion that athletes "sell their services"
and that universities are "purchasers of labor," the Seventh
Circuit held in 1992, is a "surprisingly cynical view of
college athletics." College football players are not market
participants, the court reasoned, because they are "student-
athletes.'6
Yet upon even modest cross-examination, the NCAA's
"amateur defense" seems vulnerable. Consider a recent
interview of former NCAA President Myles Brand
appearing in Sports Illustrated:
[Brand:] They can't be paid.
[Q:] Why?
[Brand:] Because they're amateurs.
[Q:] What makes them amateurs?
[Brand:] Well, they can't be paid.
[Q:] Why not?
[Brand:] Because they're amateurs.
[Q:] Who decided they are amateurs?
[Brand:] We did.
[Q:] Why?
[Brand:] Because we don't pay them.
professional draft," even where such athletes do not sign professional contracts,
against antitrust challenge).
64. Id. at 744.
65. Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1091-92 (7th Cir. 1992).
66. See id. at 1092.
67. Michael Rosenberg, Change is long overdue: College football players
should be paid, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 26, 2010, 9:43 AM),
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/michael-
rosenberg/08/26/pay.college/index.html.
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The exchange, with its shades of Abbot and Costello,
highlights the arbitrariness (and precarity) of what it
means to be a "worker." With additional tens of millions of
dollars flowing into college sports every year, the fiction of
amateurism becomes harder to maintain.
B. Big Business
The legal insulation provided by college athletes' "non-
employee" status has proven increasingly profitable for the
NCAA and its member colleges over the last several
decades, as NCAA Division I basketball and football have
evolved into lucrative industries. The NCAA bylaws provide
that competitors should be protected "from exploitation by
professional and commercial enterprises,"6 8 but in many
ways, the big-time college sports industry is itself an
exploitative commercial endeavor. This subsection explores
only briefly what has become, by one 2001 estimate, a $60
billion industry,6 9 but it underscores the growing value of
the services rendered by college athletes. Given the
astronomical dollar figures involved, it comes as little
surprise that college athletes now seek a larger slice of the
pie.
While gate receipts, licensing fees, and merchandise
sales all accrue significant revenues for universities,
television contracts have been the greatest engine of
commercialization of college sports in recent years.70 As
noted above, the NCAA recently sold the broadcasting
rights for the men's basketball tournament for $10.8 billion
over the next fourteen years, generating over $770 million
in annual income.7 1 Lucrative football television contracts
are negotiated by schools and conferences without NCAA
involvement, the result of a successful Sherman Act
challenge brought by universities against the NCAA in
68. NCAA DIVIsION I MANUAL, supra note 5, art. 2.15, at 5.
69. McCormick & McCormick, A Trail of Tears, supra note 24, at 646.
70. See BRANCH, supra note 49, at 6-7.
71. See Richard Sandomir & Pete Thamel, TV Deal Pushes N.C.A.A. Closer to
68-Team Tournament, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/04/23/sports/ncaabasketball/23ncaa.html?_r=1 (noting that the NCAA gets
$10.8 billion over the course of a fourteen-year contract, which works out to over
$770 million per year).
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1984.72 The University of Texas, for example, launched its
own twenty-four-hour television channel in August 2011,
after inking a twenty-year deal with ESPN that earns $15
million annually for the school and its marketing partner.7 3
More common are package deals negotiated by athletic
conferences, like the record-setting $3 billion, twelve-year
contract the Pacific-12 (same as Pacific-10) reached in May
2011 with ESPN and Fox.74 These negotiations have
triggered rapid conference realignments, in which
"[ulniversities around the country are tossing aside
longtime rivalries, geographic sensibilities and many of the
quaint notions ascribed to amateur athletics in an attempt
to cash in."7 5
Universities and the NCAA also profit off of college
athletes' celebrity through licensing agreements and
endorsement deals (which individual athletes, of course, are
prohibited from doing). Thus, while the NCAA investigated
Auburn University's Cam Newton for alleged recruiting
violations committed by his father, the standout
quarterback "compliantly wore at least fifteen corporate
logos-one on his jersey, four on his helmet visor, one on
each wristband, one on his pants, six on his shoes, and one
on the headband under his helmet-pursuant to Auburn's
$10.6 million deal with [apparel company] Under Armour."76
72. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 88 (1984)
(affirming lower court decision that NCAA regulation of televising of college
football games violated the Sherman Act). In a telling indication of the radical
changes to college sports in recent decades, the NCAA first regulated television
broadcasts in 1951 after concluding television "threaten[ed] to seriously harm
the nation's overall athletic and physical system" by reducing live college
football attendance. Id. at 89-90.
73. Jason Cohen, With Texas Network, U.T. Remakes the Playing Field, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 4, 2011, at A23B, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/09/04/us/04ttsports.html.
74. Richard Sandomir, Pac-10 Secures Rich Deals with Fox and ESPN, N.Y.
TIMEs, May 4, 2011, at B12.
75. Pete Thamel, In Conference Realignment, Colleges Run to (Pay)daylight,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 20, 2011, at Al. In 2010, the sixty-eight schools that make up
the six major conferences posted $2.2 billion in combined revenues and $1.1
billion in combined profits. See Chris Isidore, College football's $1.1 billion
profit, CNNMONEY (Dec. 29, 2010, 9:59 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/12/29/
news/companies/college-football dollars/index.htm.
76. BRANCH, supra note 49, at 58-61.
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New technologies generate novel ways for the NCAA to
increase revenues beyond such traditional endorsement
deals, however." For example, an agreement between the
NCAA and Electronic Arts ("EA") allows the videogame
manufacturer to produce and sell a popular title called
"NCAA Football."' Actual college athletes' individual names
are not used, but the game's virtual players share the same
"jersey number ... height, weight, build, ... home state,. . .
skin tone, hair color, and often even ... hair style" as real-
life NCAA competitors.79 When EA negotiated a similar
agreement with the NFL Players Association for its
"Madden NFL" title, athletes received $35 million in
royalties; the college athletes featured in "NCAA Football"
received nothing.so
Big-time college sports benefit universities in other
ways that are harder to measure on a balance sheet, raising
a school's profile and offering students a ready-made source
of campus entertainment. In recent years, for example, the
football team at Texas Christian University ("TCU") has
emerged as one of the nation's finest athletic programs."
The team's success has spurred a four-fold increase in
incoming applications-TCU recently receives 20,000
applicants for 1600 freshman slots-in just six years.82
Articulating a sentiment with which the University of
Chicago's William Rainey Harper would undoubtedly
identify,8 3 TCU chancellor Victor Boschini, Jr. recently
boasted, "[o]ur athletic notoriety is worth billions in
publicity."'
77. The retail market for official collegiate licensed products is now $4.3
billion per year, according to the NCAA's Collegiate Licensing Company. See
Daniel Grant, Free Speech us. Infringement in Suit on Alabama Artwork, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 31, 2012, at B12.
78. Class Action Complaint, at 3, 2009 WL 1270069, Keller v. Elec. Arts,
Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010).
79. Id. at 4.
80. See BRANCH, supra note 49, at 44-47.
81. See Joe Drape, The Outsiders: Gary Patterson has assembled a program
at Texas Christian that does more than bust the B.C.S., N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 28,
2011, at SPI.
82. Id.
83. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
84. Id.
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The tangible benefits of this rapid commercialization
are easier to quantify for coaches, however, whose salaries
have skyrocketed along with the influx of television
revenues." In part, these inflated sums reflect the rising
value (and absence of bargaining power) of the athletes
themselves. Unable to offer financial inducements to
players, athletic departments invest heavily in marquee
coaches, whose reputations can ensure the recruitment of
top-level talent.86 Of the fifty-eight basketball coaches
participating in the 2011 tournament, for whom salary
information is available, total pay exceeded $1 million per
year for thirty-one." In 2011, at least sixty-four college
football coaches also earned more than $1 million." These
massive salaries are of recent vintage; adjusted for
inflation, the average professor's salary at forty-four public
institutions increased by 32% since 1986 (to $141,600); the
average president's salary grew 90% (to $559,700); while
the average head coach's ballooned 652% (to $2,054,700).89
Public university presidents in 1986 slightly outearned
head football coaches; now coaches earn almost four times
as much as university presidents.90 When reporters recently
asked Ohio State President, E. Gorgon Gee, whether he
would consider firing scandal implicated football coach Jim
Tressel, his response reflected this shift: "I'm just hoping
the coach doesn't dismiss me."'
85. The NCAA previously attempted to restrict coaches' salaries as well,
limiting entry-level assistant coaches' salaries to $16,000 per year. Basketball
coaches brought a class action challenging the rule under the Sherman Act, and
in 1998, the Tenth Circuit upheld a district court's permanent injunction
barring the practice. See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1012 (10th Cir. 1998).
86. See CLOTFELTER, supra note 6, at 116.
87. See Jodi Upton, Salary analysis: NCAA tournament coaches cashing in,
USA TODAY (Mar. 30, 2011, 10:32 PM), www.usatoday.com/sports/college/
mensbasketball/2011-03-30-ncaa-coaches-salary-analysisN.htm.
88. Erik Brady, et al., Salaries for college football coaches back on rise, USA
TODAY (Nov. 17, 2011, 11:02 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/
football/story/2011-11-17/cover-college-football-coaches-salaries-rise/51242232/1.
89. CLOTFELTER, supra note 6, at 106 f.5.1, 266 n.39.
90. See id. at 266 n.39.
91. Albert R. Hunt, Athletics Overrun the Ivory Tower, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE,
Dec. 12, 2011, at 2.
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C. How the Other Half Lives
In exchange for the labor that sustains this industry,
the NCAA permits colleges to compensate college athletes
for "the actual cost of tuition and required institutional
fees,'92 "room and board,"9 3 academically required books,9 4
medical and life insurance,9 5 and now (for some athletes) up
to $2000 for miscellaneous expenses.9 6 The NCAA requires
institutions to "make general academic counseling and
tutoring services available to all student-athletes." And,
for the tiny fraction of NCAA football and basketball players
who go on to play professionally-1.7% and 1.2%,
respectively-coaching and training services represent a
valuable professional development opportunity.9 8 The worth
of an athletic scholarship will necessarily vary depending on
the school, but in 2009, the NCAA estimated that the
average annual value of a "full ride" was $15,000 at an in-
state public institution, $25,000 at an out-of-state public
92. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 5, art. 15.2.2, at 174.
93. Id. art. 15.2.2, at 175.
94. Id. art. 15.2.3, at 176.
95. Id. art. 16.4, at 199.
96. Days after the NCPA submitted its petition in October 2011, the NCAA
approved legislation allowing schools to provide promising recruits additional
grants to cover miscellaneous expenses, "up to the full cost of attendance or
$2000, whichever is less." After significant protest from member institutions,
the NCAA agreed in January 2012 to temporarily suspend the initiative
pending further debate. Meanwhile, however, the vast majority of the nation's
top high school prospects had already signed binding "letters of intent." The
NCAA says it will honor agreements for those prospects promised stipends
during the 2011 signing window, meaning hundreds of players will receive such
payments come Fall 2013. See Brad Wolverton, Athletes Inch Closer to $2,000
Stipend, Multiyear Awards, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 14, 2012, available
at http://chronicle.com/blogs/players/athletes-inch-closer-to-multiyear-awards-
2000-stipend/29436. As of the time of press, the NCAA had not formally
implemented the $2000 stipend proposal. See Spurrier wants college players to
earn as much as $4,000 a year, CBS SPORTS.CoM (May 31, 2012),
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/story/ 19216265/spurrier-wants-college-
players-to-earn-as-much-as-4000-a-year.
97. NCAA DivSION I MANUAL, supra note 5, art. 16.3.1.1, at 199.
98. NCAA, Estimated Probability of Competing in Athletics Beyond the High
School Interscholastic Level, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/
public/NCAAlpdfs/2011/2011+Probability+of+Going+Pro (last updated Sept. 27,
2011).
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institution, and slightly more than $35,000 at a private
institution.9 9 NCAA Bylaws make clear that universities can
provide these considerable sums to athletes solely on the
basis of athletic promise, not economic need or academic
potential.'"
As NCAA critics frequently point out, however, a full
athletic scholarship often fails to cover basic expenses that
college athletes incur.'o' A recent study conducted by the
NCPA and Drexel University pegged the average
"scholarship shortfall"-the gap between a "full" NCAA
scholarship and the actual cost of attendance-of a Division
I football player at $3222 per year.'0 2 At some institutions
the annual scholarship shortfall totals more than $6000.'ol
According to the study, this leaves approximately 85% of
"full" scholarship athletes living below federal poverty
thresholds.'" Indeed, while NCAA bylaws prohibit
scholarship athletes from receiving many types of external
assistance, the NCAA explicitly authorizes players to
receive taxpayer-funded food stamps.' 5 The NCAA
responded to these criticisms in late 2011, proposing
legislation that allows individual institutions (if authorized
by their athletic conference) to provide athletes additional
grants "up to the cost of attendance or $2,000, whichever is
less."0 6 While the measure would help reduce the
scholarship shortfall for many players, this language
99. NCAA, Behind the Blue Disk: How Do Athletic Scholarships Work? (2011),
NCAA.oRG (June 21, 2011), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/
Resources/Behind+the+Blue+Disk/How+Do+Athletic+Scholarships+Work.
100. See NCAA DIVIslON I MANUAL, supra note 5, art. 15.1, at 174.
101. See Ramogi Huma & Ellen J. Staurowsky, The Price of Poverty in Big-
Time College Sport, NAT'L COLLEGE PLAYERS Assoc., 3-4 (2011),
http://assets.usw.org/npa/The-Price-of-Poverty-in-Big-Time-College-Sport.pdf.
102. Id. at 4.
103. Id. at 3.
104. Id. at 16.
105. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 5, art. 15.2.2.5, at 176.
106. NCAA Division I Board of Directors, Division I Proposal 2011-96
("Financial Aid-Maximum Limits on Financial Aid-Individual and Team
Limits"), Oct. 3, 2011, https://webl.ncaa.org/LSDBilexec/links (highlight
"Search" hyperlink; then follow "Division I Proposals" hyperlink; then search
"2011-96" in the "Proposal Number" box; and follow "Go Search" hyperlink).
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("whichever is less") implicitly concedes that even an
additional $2000 may not cover the "full cost of attendance."
Once promising Division I basketball and football
athletes sign scholarship agreements, university officials
exercise extensive control over their daily lives (a factor
that, as we shall see in Parts II and III, is often relevant in
determining "employee" status).0 7 One independent study
concludes that a "conservative estimate of a player's time
commitment to football during the week of a home game is
approximately fifty-three hours," and is possibly much
greater during the week of an away game.os College
basketball athletes face a similarly rigorous, and highly
regimented, schedule.'" During the off-season, athletes'
lives in both sports are highly controlled by their teams,
with compulsory early-morning conditioning sessions,
weightlifting sessions, team meetings, video review
sessions, and other grueling practice sessions."o To an
extent far exceeding that of ordinary campus employees,
"virtually every detail of [basketball and football players']
lives is carefully controlled by coaches and athletic staff, not
only during the season but year around.""'
In his scathing memoir, former NCAA director Walter
Byers attacked "the plantation mentality" embodied in this
arrangement, and indeed, the politics of race loom heavily
over debates about college athletes' labor."2 During the
2010-2011 year, black athletes constituted 59.3% of
107. See McCormick & McCormick, Myth, supra note 22, at 98-101, 105-07.
108. Id. at 98-101. NCAA rules purport to limit student-athletes "to a
maximum of four hours per day and 20 hours per week." NCAA DIVsION I
MANUAL, supra note 5, art. 17.1.6, at 216. Even the NCAA's own internal
studies, however, have found the time commitment for football and men's
basketball athletes to be equivalent to a full-time job. See NCAA, Summary of
Findings from the 2010 GOALS and SCORE Studies of the Student-Athlete
Experience (Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/publicNCAA/
Resources/Research/Student-Athlete+Experience+Research.
109. See McCormick & McCormick, Myth, supra note 22, at 106-09.
110. Id. at 101-02, 106.
111. McCormick & McCormick, A Trail of Tears, supra note 24, at 649.
112. BYERS, supra note 59, at 390-91; see also McCormick & McCormick, A
Trail of Tears, supra note 24, at 660-65 (discussing the racial implication of
NCAA amateurism rules); BRANCH, supra note 49, at 14 ("College athletes are
not slaves. Yet to survey the scene ... is to catch a whiff of the plantation.").
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Division I basketball players and 47.6% of Football
Championship Series players, more than any other racial
group."1 The comfortable majority of head basketball
coaches (72.8%), head football coaches (83.7%), and athletic
directors (83.3%), however, were white.'14 As Dale Brown,
the longtime Louisiana State University head basketball
coach, once candidly complained: "Look at the money we
make off predominantly poor black kids. We're the
whoremasters." 1 5
The practical demands placed on "student-athletes" all
but dictate that they become athletes first, and students
second. In order to maintain their eligibility to compete,
players must pursue a "full-time [12 credit-hour] program of
studies,""6 but many of the NCAA's academic standards are
"formulated to serve universities' commercial interests
rather than bona fide academic values."l 7 Low academic
expectations are, in fact, embedded in the NCAA's eligibility
requirements: high school seniors who score a 400 on the
SAT (reflecting no correct answers) may nevertheless be
eligible to compete during their first year."' College athletes
must select course schedules consistent with team practices,
and athletic responsibilities regularly require them to miss
113. NCAA, NCAA Race and Gender Demographics, NCAA.ORG.,
http://webl.ncaa.org/rgdSearch/exec/main (follow "Student-Athlete Data"
hyperlink; then search "2010-2011" for "Select an Academic Year," search
"Division I" for "Select a Division," and search "Basketball" or "Football" for
"Select a Sport;" then follow "View Report" hyperlink). White athletes, by
comparison, constituted 28.8% and 41.4% of basketball and football players,
respectively. Id.
114. ERIN IRICK, 2009-10 NCAA RACE AND GENDER DEMOGRAPHICS REPORT, 35
tbl.5b: Head Coaches, 91 tbl.5b: Athletics Administrative Staff (2011),
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Research/Diversi
ty+Research.
115. ANDREw ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND
CONFLICT IN BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS 20 (2001).
116. NCAA DIvIsION I MANUAL, supra note 5, art. 14.1.8.2, at 131.
117. McCormick & McCormick, Myth, supra note 22, at 135.
118. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 5, art. 14.3.1.1.2, at 144 (finding
freshman athletes eligible to compete with a combined verbal and math SAT
score of 400, provided their core high school GPA is 3.55 or higher). See also
Christopher L. Chin, Illegal Procedures: The NCAA's Unlawful Restraint of the
Student-Athlete, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1213, 1240, n.226 (noting lax treatment of
promising athletes "as early as junior high school" to boost students' GPAs).
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classes."' Studies have found that college athletes generally
enter college with considerable optimism, carrying high
aspirations and "idealistic expectations about their
impending academic experience."12 As the practical realities
of athletic obligations set in, however, they become
"increasingly cynical about and uninterested in
academics." 2' Low graduation rates predictably reflect this
sense of detachment. While the NCAA boasts that "student-
athletes," as a whole, academically outperform non-
athletes,122 football and men's basketball players' graduation
rates are 17.7% and 34.3% lower, respectively, than other
full-time male students at their schools.12 3
**0
Today's college sports industry is the inevitable result of
a long-standing paradox: throughout the past century, the
NCAA has never recognized any inconsistency between its
defense of the amateur ideal and its promotion of college
athletics as a revenue-generating business.124 Even in its
early decades, when the NCAA adhered to a far stricter
understanding of amateurism, the organization actively
cultivated college athletics as a burgeoning commercial
spectacle.125 Today, with the economic stakes dramatically
119. McCormick & McCormick, Myth, supra note 22, at 142.
120. PETER ADLER & PATRICIA A. ADLER, BACKBOARDS AND BLACKBOARDS:
COLLEGE ATHLETES AND ROLL ENGULFMENT xi, 62 (1991) (discussing ten years of
participant-observations of college basketball players at five universities).
121. Id. at 189.
122. See NCAA, NCAA grad rates hit all-time high, NCAA.coM (Oct. 24, 2011,
2:22 PM), http://www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa/article/2011-10-25/ncaa-grad-rates-
hit-all-time-high.
123. E. Woodrow Eckard, NCAA Athlete Graduation Rates: Less Than Meets
the Eye, 24 J. SPORTS MGMT. 45, 53-54, tbl.3 (2010). Despite recent
improvements, fifteen of the "Top 25" football programs in 2011 remain unable
to graduate more than two-thirds of their athletes; in men's basketball, "72 of
the 327 Division I programs . . . saw fewer than half their players earn
diplomas-including 2010 regional finalists Tennessee (40%), Kansas State
(40%) and Kentucky (44%)." Steve Wieberg, NCAA football grad rates at all-time
high, but top schools falter, USA TODAY (Oct. 27, 2011, 6:42 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/2010-10-27-ncaa-graduation-rates-
study-N.htm.
124. See SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 41, at 79.
125. See id. at 32.
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higher, the NCAA continues to defend the compatibility of
amateurism and commercialism. While the NCAA
acknowledges that "[s]ome fans believe institutional
relationships with corporate entities somehow tarnish the
amateur status of those who play the games," the
organization nevertheless insists that "'amateur' describes
intercollegiate athletics participants, not the enterprise." 26
But with billions of dollars now generated by the labor
of "those who play the games," and many of these young
athletes living in poverty, the myth of the "student-athlete"
has become harder to maintain. The NCAA's emphasis on
amateur competition, once a quixotic effort to maintain the
"purity" of an already commercialized game, has become a
cynical justification for maintaining a lucrative status quo.
II. COLLEGE ATHLETES & THE NLRA
The principal accomplishment (indeed, the very
purpose) of the "student-athlete" label was to "de-labor"
college athletes, to fashion a workforce largely divested of
legal rights with respect to the services it provides. While
the NCAA has largely succeeded in past decades in arguing
that "student-athletes" are not engaged in "work" for
workers' compensation purposes,12 the question of whether
college athletes are "employees" under existing labor law
statutes requires a separate analysis.
The NLRA, as the centerpiece of American labor
relations for the past eight decades, is a logical starting
point for this inquiry. Although we argue in Part III that
state labor law provides a more promising path for college
athletes seeking to unionize, our discussion of federal
precedent serves several purposes. First, previous
treatments of the potential unionization of college sports
overlook the fact that, for many decades, the NLRB
accepted the "universities are different" rationale to strip all
university workers of collective bargaining rights. In
Section A, we discuss the expansion of NLRA jurisdiction to
cover college campuses, a shift triggered by the Board's
recognition that colleges and universities play an
126. NCAA, Commercialism, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/
connect/public/Test/Issues/Commercialism+overview (last updated July 27,
2010).
127. See supra Part I.A.
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increasingly prominent role as commercial enterprises.
Second, federal precedent serves to introduce several
important "tests" that state-level boards and courts have
since adopted (or rejected) in weighing the "employee"
status of student-employees. In Section B, we consider the
various approaches the NLRB has used in cases involving
students, and evaluate how college athletes would fair
under these standards. Finally, in Section C, we highlight
an additional NLRB case-overlooked in previous
scholarship because it arose outside the academic context-
that lends considerable support to the prospect of a "union
of amateurs" under the NLRA.
A. The NLRA and the Ivory Tower
Just as the NCAA now claims that the special
characteristics of the academic setting militates against
recognizing college athletes as "employees" under relevant
labor law, universities maintained for several decades that
they were not "employers" covered by § 2(2) of the NLRA.128
Although NLRB-sanctioned collective bargaining in the
academic context is now commonplace, the NLRB accepted
this argument for the first thirty-five years of the act's
existence. The Board recognized in 1951 that educational
institutions were undeniably "employers" in the most basic
sense contemplated by the act, but still considered it unwise
to interfere with relationships that were "noncommercial"
and "intimately connected with the . . . educational
activities of the institution." 29 Thus, even where "a group of
employees perform[ed] tasks functionally identical to those
performed by employees in private industry"-clerical
128. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006) (defining "employer" for NLRA. purposes).
129. Columbia Univ., 97 N.L.R.B. 424, 426 (1951), overruled by Cornell Univ.,
183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970). The Board did occasionally assert jurisdiction,
however, over commercial ventures overseen by institutions (or their divisions)
that generated significant revenue for the schools. Thus, the Board recognized
employees at a nonprofit trade school that made and repaired tools for the Ford
Motor Company, Henry Ford Trade Sch., 58 N.L.R.B. 1535, 1536 (1944), a
profitable research center within a nonprofit university, Illinois Inst of Tech., 82
N.L.R.B. 201, 201-03 (1949), and a college-owned commercial radio station, Port
Arthur Coll., 92 N.L.R.B. 152, 152 (1950). And, of course, workers at private
universities occasionally unionized even without protection of the NLRA. See,
e.g., John Wilhelm, A Short History of Unionization at Yale, 14 Soc. TEXT 13
(1996).
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workers, maintenance personnel, laboratory technicians,
dining hall workers, etc.-"the employer's [educational]
purpose[]" was sufficient jrounds to deny employees
collective bargaining rights.
In the early 1970s, in a landmark case brought by
maintenance personnel at Syracuse University and
librarians at Cornell University, a unanimous NLRB
changed course. 3 ' Higher education was changing rapidly,
the Board noted, and "to carry out its educative functions,
the university has become involved in a host of activities
which are commercial in character."'32 Education was "still
the primary goal of such institutions," the Board explained,
but nonprofit universities' educational purpose was no
longer sufficient to justify treating them any differently
than other "employers" under the Act.'3 3
The burgeoning college athletics industry helped
influence this shift. When the NLRB declined to assert
jurisdiction over a petition filed by librarians at Columbia
University in 1951, the university's involvement in non-
academic commercial ventures was relatively modest. The
school made "$4,890 from the sale of photostats, microfilms,
and the Germanic and Romanic Reviews," the Board
observed, and "$21,150 from the sale of radio and television
rights to its football games.""' When the Board began
asserting jurisdiction over universities two decades later, it
highlighted that Syracuse University "realize[d] $500,000
annually from the sale of tickets for football games, and
$250,000 from the sale of television and radio rights.""'
Such commercial profits-still relatively humble compared
to today's figures-helped dismantle the rationale for
treating educational institutions differently from other
private employers. Also significant, these early Board cases
identified the emergent big-time college sports industry for
130. Frederick E. Sherman & Dennis B. Black, The Labor Board and the
Private Nonprofit Employer: A Critical Examination of the Board's Worthy
Cause Exemption, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1323, 1324 (1970) (emphasis added).
131. See Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. at 336 (deeming the employees a union
for purposes of collective bargaining).
132. Id. at 332.
133. Id. at 332-33.
134. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 97 N.L.R.B. at 425 n.2.
135. Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. at 330.
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what it was: a commercial enterprise, largely unconnected
to the pedagogical mission of the university.
B. The Medical & Graduate Student Analogy
Soon after the NLRB ruled that universities are
"employers" under federal labor law, the question arose
whether certain students-those performing labor for their
university in exchange for tuition or other compensation-
qualify as "employees" under § 2(3) of the Act. This
determination is critical, of course, because only statutory
"employees" are entitled to the basic rights and protections
contemplated by the Act.'3 6 Unhelpfully, though, the NLRA
provides a circular definition of "employee" ("[t]he term
'employee' shall include any employee . . .") with several
categorical exceptions.137 Over seventy-five years since the
NLRA's enactment, as several cases brought by students
claiming "employee" status have shown, the precise
contours of this statutory definition are still in dispute.138
1. The "Right-of-Control" Test: College Athletes Under
Boston Medical Center and New York University. Because
the NLRA provides little explicit guidance as to the term
"employee," the Board and courts have regularly relied upon
the "right-of-control" test (also referred to as the common
law agency test) to determine "employee" status.'39 This
136. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (delineating rights of employees).
137. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006) ("The term 'employee' shall include any
employee . . . unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise, and shall
include any individual whose work has ceased [due to] any current labor dispute
or because of any unfair labor practice . . . but shall not include any individual
employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or
person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any
individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual
employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to
the Railway Labor Act . . . or by any other person who is not an employer as
herein defined.").
138. See Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can't Tell an Employee When
it Sees One and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
295, 314-21 (2001); Anne Marie Lofaso, The Vanishing Employee: Putting the
Autonomous Dignified Union Worker Back to Work, 5 FLA. INT'L U. L. REV. 495,
499-501 (2010) (discussing the idea of the autonomous workplace and whether
the statutory definition of "employee" describes the autonomous worker).
139. See NLRB. v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968) ("[Tlhere is
no doubt that we should apply the common-law agency test here in
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standard, based on the feudal master-servant relationship
described in Blackstone's COMMENTARIES,' uses traditional
agency principles to determine if a cognizable employment
relationship exists.'4 1 As the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY explains, a "servant" is "a person employed to
perform services in the affairs of another and who[,] with
respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the
services[,] is subject to the other's control or right to
control." 4 2
In two important cases involving students in 1999 and
2000, the NLRB emphasized that the "definition of the term
'employee' as used in the Act reflect[s] the common law
agency doctrine of the conventional master-servant
relationship," and used this standard to recognize student-
workers' right to unionize as statutory "employees."'4 3 First,
in Boston Medical Center, the Board reversed twenty-three
years of precedent and held that medical "house staff'
(interns, residents, and fellows) were statutory employees,
"notwithstanding that a purpose of their being at a hospital
may also be, in part, educational."'" The statutory
formulation that "'employee' shall include any employee,"
the Board explained, was intended to emphasize the
breadth of the ordinary definition of the term. 145 Thus, it
must extend to any "person who works for another in return
for financial or other compensation," or any "person in the
distinguishing an employee from an independent contractor.") (citation omitted);
Teamsters Nat'l Auto. Transp. Indus. Negotiation Comm., 355 N.L.R.B. 830, 832
(2001) ("[TIhe contracting employer must have the power to give the employees
the work in question-the so-called 'right of control' test. . . ."); Steinberg & Co.,
78 N.L.R.B. 211, 220-21 (1948) (interpreting recent Taft-Hartley amendments to
indicate Congress' approval of the "ordinary tests of the law of agency,"
specifically the "familiar 'right-of-control test,'" to determine employee status)
(citation omitted), set aside by NLRB v. Steinberg, 182 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1950).
140. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAwS OF ENGLAND 410-
20.
141. See NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 93-95 (1995)
(defining "employee" by reference to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY).
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).
143. Boston Med. Ctr., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 160 (1999); see also New York Univ.,
332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1205 (2000) (also employing the master-servant test),
overruled by Brown University, 342 N.L.R.B 483 (2004).
144. Boston Med. Ctr., 330 N.L.R.B. at 160.
145. Id. (quoting Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. at 90).
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service of another under any contract of hire, express or
implied, oral or written, where the employer has the power
or right to control and direct the employees in the material
details of how the work is to be performed."" Because "[t]he
exclusions listed in [N 2(3) of the NLRA] are limited and
narrow, and do not . .. encompass the category 'students,"'
the house staff were found to be "employees" under the
Act. 147
The following year, the Board similarly found graduate
students serving as teaching and research assistants to be
statutory "employees" in the New York University case.148
Again the Board relied on the common law definition of an
employment relationship, which "exists when a servant
performs services for another, under the other's control or
right of control, and in return for payment. 1 49 The
university attempted to distinguish Boston Medical Center
by arguing that graduate assistants spend significantly less
time than house staff performing services, and are
compensated only as "financial aid," but the Board found
both of these arguments unconvincing."o Next the Board
considered two proffered "policy reasons" why (despite
finding graduate assistants to be "employees") it might be
preferable to exclude graduate students from coverage
under the Act.'s' The university argued that the Board
should not sanction collective bargaining because graduate
students "do not have a traditional economic relationship
with the Employer," and because doing so might "infringe
146. Id.
147. Id. Despite the Board's expansive language that affirmed students' place
within the NLRA definition of "employee," the majority opinion consistently
attempted to distance house staff from ordinary students. It noted that house
staff were more akin to apprentices, serving in low-paying hospital jobs for a set
period of time so that they can become fully certified and later practice wherever
they wish. While recognizing that "house staff possess certain attributes of
student status," the Board highlighted the fact that "they are unlike many
others in the traditional academic setting," particularly with respect to tuition,
traditional examinations, and grades. Id. at 161. Thus, although the Board
stressed the point that student status "does not . . . change the evidence of ...
'employee' status," it partially hedged in the final analysis. Id. at 160-61.
148. See New York Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. at 1205.
149. Id. at 1205-06.
150. See id. at 1206-07.
151. See id. at 1207-08.
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on the Employer's academic freedom."'5 2 Again the Board
rejected these arguments, finding "no basis to deny
collective-bargaining rights to statutory employees merely
because they are employed by an educational institution in
which they are enrolled as students."'5 3
College athletes meet the criteria of this basic "common
law test" as set forth in Boston Medical Center and New
York University: they: (a) perform services for another, (b)
under the other's control or right of control, and (c) do so in
return for payment. First, as performers at the center of a
multibillion dollar industry, college athletes plainly
"perform services" (just like medical students and graduate
assistants) from which universities and others benefit. In
terms of actual services performed, big-time college athletes
in football and basketball are largely indistinguishable from
their unionized counterparts in professional sports. Second,
to a degree surpassing almost any other type of university
employee (including other student-employees), college
athletes' labor and lives are subject to their employer's
control. On the field, of course, big-time college athletes
must undergo physically demanding (and occasionally
hazardous) training regimens and competitions.'5 4 As noted
in Part I, the time commitments of practice and competition
schedules typically exceed those of a full-time job-sharply
limiting the availability of a traditional "student"
experience-and may extend even into the supposed "off-
season.""' Off the field, too, universities' control over
athletes extends in ways most other employees would
consider intolerable: college athletes are closely monitored
in terms of what substances they should (protein
supplements, creatine) and should not (alcohol) consume;
how they spend their free time and, per NCAA regulations,
how they may benefit from their labor outside of sports.'
Finally, college athletes receive "payment" for these
services in the form of tuition, room and board, and
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1205.
154. See McCormick & McCormick, Myth, supra note 22, 97-117 (documenting
in extensive detail the degree of control exercised over college athletes in their
daily lives).
155. See id. at 99-108.
156. See id. at 97-109.
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potentially, for some, unrestricted $2000 stipends.' While
the NCAA may characterize such compensation as
"financial aid" or "scholarships" (as with the graduate
assistants in New York University) they represent a form of
valuable consideration for services rendered. Professors
McCormick and McCormick, writing before the NCAA
began allowing supplemental cash stipends, creatively
likened this practice to payment in company scrip,
redeemable only at a company-owned store (the university
itself).' That such remuneration constitutes "payment"-as
opposed to, perhaps, "gifts"-is made clear when college
athletes quit (or are cut) from a team. As University of
Michigan football coach Brady Hoke recently explained,
"Obviously you quit football, you're not going to be on
scholarship." 59
2. The "Primary Purpose" Test: College Athletes Under
Brown University. The newfound freedom of graduate
students to organize proved short-lived, as the Board
explicitly overruled New York University less than four
years later in Brown University." In a 3-2 decision, the
Board denied graduate assistants the right to unionize,
determining that they "are primarily students and have a
primarily educational, not economic, relationship with their
university."6 1 As such, the petitioners were found to be
"nonemployees" under the Act.16 2
The Board's precise rationale for determining that
graduate assistants were "primarily students" (and,
therefore, not "employees") is somewhat difficult to discern,
but four categories of concerns guided the decision. First,
157. See supra notes 24, 80-91, 101.
158. McCormick & McCormick, Myth, supra note 22, at 78.
159. Brian Bennett, Big Ten schools offering more security, ESPN.coM (Feb. 1,
2012), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/id/7528614/some-big-ten-offering-
4-year-scholarships (emphasizing contingency of college athletes, even under
new NCAA policy allowing universities to grant four-year scholarships instead
of one-year renewable scholarships).
160. 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 483 (2004). Puzzlingly, the Board emphasized that it
"express[ed] no opinion regarding the Board's decision in Boston Medical
Center," despite noting that it made use of the same "master-servant test" in
evaluating student-employees' status. Id. at 483 n.4.
161. Id. at 487, 490.
162. Id. at 487.
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the Board "emphasize [d] the simple, undisputed fact that all
the petitioned-for individuals are students and must first be
enrolled" to be eligible for the job.16 3 Second, the Board
discussed "the role of [the labor] in graduate education."'"
Under this heading, the Board noted the "limited" time
commitment required by graduate assistantships (students'
"principal time commitment . . . is focused on obtaining a
degree [rather than graduate assistantships] and thus,
being a student")6 5 and the extent to which the required
labor "is part and parcel of the core elements" of the degree
program. 6 Third, the Board emphasized the extent to
which assistantships received oversight by academic
faculty, "often the same faculty that teach or advise the
graduate assistant student in their coursework or
dissertation."'6 7 Such oversight bolstered the university's
assertion that graduate assistants were participating in
academic (as opposed to economic) relationships. Fourth,
the Board highlighted the form of financial support
provided to graduate students in exchange for their labor.
Noting that "a significant segment of the funds received ...
is for full tuition," and that the university "recognize [d] the
need for financial support" of its graduate students, the
Board characterized the payments as a form of financial aid
to students (not traditional "wages").'6 8 Taken together,
these factors established that "the overall relationship
between the graduate student assistants and Brown is
primarily an educational one, rather than an economic
one." 69
The primary purpose test articulated in Brown
University is plainly less favorable to student-employees,
and several of the emphasized factors would cut against a
finding that college athletes are "employees" under § 2(3) of
the Act. The Board's emphasis on whether the purported
163. Id. at 488.
164. Id. at 489.
165. Id. at 488.
166. Id.; see also id. at 483 ("[Slupervised teaching or research is an integral
component of [graduate students'] academic development.").
167. Id. at 489.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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employees "must first be enrolled [as students]," 7 0 for
example, establishes a presumption against recognizing a
cognizable employment relationship wherever enrollment is
an eligibility requirement for a job. Because college athletes
must necessarily be enrolled students, this factor is
unhelpful to college athletes' cases. Likewise, the Board's
attention to the form of financial remuneration is
significant: compensation that helps pay for tuition and is
characterized as "financial aid,"'7 1 it appears, is categorically
different from ordinary consideration for work performed.
As universities and the NCAA often stress, grants-in-aid
are not payment for "work," but rather a species of
scholarship (albeit based on something other than economic
need or academic merit). More generally, the majority
approach in Brown University appears to ignore, or reject,
the helpful insight that individuals can be both students
and employees of an institution simultaneously. As a
blistering dissent aptly noted, "[tihe Act requires merely the
existence of [a meaningful] economic relationship, not that
it be the only or the primary relationship between a
statutory employee and a statutory employer." 2
Ironically, however, because of its focus on the academic
relevance of the services rendered, the Board's decision
divesting graduate assistants of their "employee" status
may bolster analogous claims by college athletes. In its
lengthy discussion of the "role of graduate assistantships in
graduate education,"'7 3 the Board noted that the
assistantship labor consumes only a "limited" amount of the
students' time,174 and that "supervised teaching or research
is an integral component of [graduate students'] academic
development." 75 In Brown University, "it [was] beyond
dispute that [the students'] principal time commitment . . .
[was] focused on obtaining a degree," 76 but for college
athletes, the exact opposite is true. Similarly, the Board
emphasized that, for the vast majority of graduate students
170. Id. at 488.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 497 (Liebman and Walsh, Members, dissenting).
173. Id. at 489.
174. Id. at 488.
175. Id. at 4 8 3.
176. Id. at 488.
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at Brown University, serving as a graduate teaching or
research assistant was a graduation requirement for their
academic program.17 7 Only a tiny minority of college
students ever participate as varsity athletes in big-time
college sports-certainly no college requires this-so it is
unlikely that such services could be considered "part and
parcel of the core elements" of a standard undergraduate
degree. And, of course, unlike graduate assistantships,
college athletes' labor is not overseen by academic faculty.
Particularly given the extraordinary sums their labor
generates, there is a colorable claim that, under the primary
purpose test, the overall relationship between college
athletes and their universities is primarily an economic
one.17 8
C. The Chorister Analogy? College Athletes Under Seattle
Opera
These "student-employee" cases will likely frame any
NLRB treatment of college athletes, but another (entirely
overlooked) case involving "auxiliary choristers" at the
Seattle Opera may lend additional support for college
athletes. The case focused on the "employee" status of a
group of choristers, who were essentially-at least as much
as college athletes-"amateur" entertainers. Rejecting the
Seattle Opera's claims that the choristers were "volunteers"
motivated by their love of opera (rather than the minimal
compensation provided), both the NLRB (in 2000)17' and the
D.C. Circuit (in 2002)"0 held that the choristers were
"employees" under the NLRA.
177. Id.
178. At press, the National Labor Relations Board had granted review in two
cases that may ultimately reverse the standard for graduate student unions at
private universities. In its "Notice and Invitation to File Briefs," issued on June
21, 2012, the Board invited argument on whether Brown University's "primary
purpose" test should continue to guide the Board's interpretation of § 2(3).
Briefing should be completed by end of July 2012. See Board grants review,
invites briefs on question of graduate student assistant status in two cases,
NLRB.Gov (June 22, 2012), http://www.nlrb.gov/news/board-grants-review-
invites-briefs-question-graduate-student-assistant-status-two-cases.
179. Seattle Opera Ass'n, 331 N.L.R.B. 1072, 1072 (2000).
180. Seattle Opera v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 757, 757 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
1036 [Vol. 60
A UNION OF AMATEURS
The employment relationships of the 200 "auxiliary
choristers"-a pool of talented opera aficionados
occasionally called upon to supplement large productions-
are analogous to those of college athletes. Like promising
athletic recruits, the choristers signed "Letters of Intent"
with the Seattle Opera, obliging them to comply with
attendance and decorum requirements set forth in a
handbook.'' Once engaged, the opera "possess[ed] the right
to control the [] choristers in the material details of their
performance," giving them "artistic feedback . . . and
dramatic direction while on stage."'8 2 In exchange for their
participation, the choristers received ten tickets to dress
rehearsal performancesl8 and a modest one-time
"honorarium" (equivalent to $2.78 per hour, when spread
over twenty-two rehearsals and performances) to defray
parking and transportation expenses.'84 The "choristers
provide[d] a service to the community and presumably
derive [d] pleasure and satisfaction in performing," the
Board conceded, but the opera's reimbursements also
constituted a form of material compensation for the
choristers' labor or services.' This created an "economic
relationship," however rudimentary, making the choristers
"employees" under § 2(3) of the NLRA.'8 6 Though the Seattle
Opera and college athletics plainly cater to different
audiences, in many significant respects-a prestigious
nonprofit employer, informal employment agreements,
codified behavior guidelines, controlled and directed
performances, disputed subjective motivations, and minimal
(though artfully characterized) compensation-the labor of
their indispensible performers is virtually identical.
*0*
In sum, existing Board precedent does not foreclose
(and, indeed, may actually favor) the claim that college
181. Seattle Opera Ass'n, 331 N.L.R.B. at 1072.
182. Seattle Opera, 292 F.3d at 765.
183. See Seattle Opera Ass'n, 331 N.L.R.B. at 1072; cf NCAA DIVISION I
MANUAL, supra note 5, art. 16.2.1.1, at 198 ("An institution may provide four
complimentary admissions per home or away intercollegiate athletics event to a
student-athlete ... .).
184. See Seattle Opera, 292 F.3d at 760, 773.
185. Seattle Opera Ass'n, 331 N.L.R.B. at 1072-73.
186. See id. at 1073.
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athletes are "employees" under the NLRA. Whether the
NLRB remains with the primary purpose test or returns to
the more relaxed common law standard, analogies to
previous student-employee cases support the argument that
college athletes are entitled to statutory protection.
But previous scholarly work overemphasizes the
likelihood of college athletes successfully unionizing
through the NLRB. As a threshold matter, such treatments
ignore the fact that the NLRB lacks jurisdiction over public
universities, and is therefore powerless to recognize as
"employees" the majority of college athletes. More generally,
though, focusing on favorable language in Board rulings,
particularly Brown University, may miss the forest for the
trees. Both prior to Boston Medical Center and in its most
recent opinion, the Board has evinced considerable hostility
toward recognizing that individuals can have dual
relationships with academic institutions as both students
and workers. This basic analytical move is critical to any
claim brought by college athletes. State labor boards, in
contrast, have recognized for decades that the services
provided by student-employees can constitute a form of
"work."l87
III. STATE LABOR LAW
While several scholars have set forth some version of
the argument in Part II.B-that NCAA athletes likely enjoy
collective bargaining rights under NLRB precedent
involving other student-employees-they have overlooked
federal labor law's limited reach. The NLRA ordinarily
preempts attempts by states to establish alternative
regimes governing collective bargaining between employers
and employees,1' but the NLRA specifically exempts from
its definition of employer "any State or political subdivision
thereof."1 89 This statutory exemption leaves collective
bargaining rights for public employees, including those at
187. See infra Part III.
188. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 236
(1959) (stating that "[flailure of the [NLRA] to assume jurisdiction does not
leave the States free to regulate activities they would otherwise be precluded
from regulating.").
189. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006).
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public universities (athletic or otherwise), contingent on
state law.
Unions of public sector workers have existed throughout
the twentieth century,9 0 but it was not until Wisconsin
enacted a landmark law in 1959 that states began to
formally recognize and encourage collective bargaining of
their employees. 9 ' By 1972, "the debate over the legitimacy
of unionism in the government sector [had become] largely
academic," with the majority of states enacting legislation
allowing collective bargaining for public employees.'9 2
Generally, these laws mirrored federal labor law: "[m]any
[state] statutes dr[ew] heavily on the NLRA in their
definitions"l 9 3-including their (vague and circular)
definitions of "employee"-and created state labor boards to
adjudicate controversies over disputed provisions. This
"similarity in language . . . has led to extensive reliance
upon federal precedents" by state labor boards and courts.'94
And, as a result, most previous scholars have simply
assumed that college athletes would therefore be treated
comparably under federal and state labor law regimes.
Professors McCormick and McCormick, for example, in their
otherwise thorough discussion of potential unionization of
college athletes, conclude that because many states' labor
statutes are modeled on the NLRA, federal law "remains
the starting, and usually ending, point for this inquiry" into
"employee" status.'9 5
190. See JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS,
THE LAW, AND THE STATE, 1900-1962 1-2 (2004).
191. See id. at 158-92. (discussing passage of Wisconsin's public sector labor
laws of 1959 and 1962).
192. Harry T. Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71
MICH. L. REV. 885, 885-86 (1972) (noting "rapid and accelerating growth" of
public-sector collective bargaining over preceding decade). Notwithstanding the
recent high-profile disputes in Wisconsin and Indiana, a comfortable majority of
states continue to allow at least some public employees collective bargaining
rights. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING RIGHTS: INFORMATION ON THE NUMBER OF WORKERS WITH AND
WITHOUT BARGAINING RIGHTS GAO-02-835, at 1-3, 8-9 (2002).
193. Note, Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARv. L. REV.
1611, 1680 (1984).
194. DONALD H. WOLLETT ET AL., COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT 25 (4th ed. 1993).
195. McCormick & McCormick, Myth, supra note 22, at 88.
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Yet however closely state labor boards and courts may
track the NLRB in other contexts, they have diverged from
federal precedent when determining the "employee" status
of student workers. In adjudicating whether students who
provide services for their universities are "employees"
entitled to union recognition, state labor boards (unlike the
NLRB) have repeatedly recognized that students can have
dual academic and economic relationships with their
universities. Even in states with statutory language
identical to the definition of "employee" in NLRA § 2(3),
students at public universities often enjoy more robust
rights than their counterparts at private universities. As we
show below, some states' approaches present more
auspicious openings to college athletes than others. But in
at least a dozen states, it seems likely that NCAA college
athletes satisfy the statutory definition of "employee."
The following section provides the first detailed survey
of state laws regarding the collective bargaining rights of
students at public universities and explores the status of
NCAA athletes under these regimes. In Section A, we
consider in depth four states (California, Florida, Michigan,
and Nebraska) where college athletes at big-time athletics
programs might seek to unionize. Favorable state
constitutional and statutory provisions, expansive
interpretations of those provisions by state labor boards and
courts, demonstrated success in organizing college athletes,
a history of undergraduate and graduate unionism, and
other political considerations render these states (all of
which are home to large, lucrative college athletics
programs) particularly promising for college athletes. In
Section B, we discuss another twelve states where graduate
and undergraduate students have unionized at public
universities. While college athletes would struggle to gain
union recognition in a few of these states, labor boards in
most have issued rulings that would likely recognize a
cognizable employer-employee relationship when applied to
universities and their athletes. In the interest of space, we
provide less detailed discussions of these jurisdictions,
though some (e.g., Oregon, Massachusetts) may be even
more favorable to college athletes than states discussed in
Section A. Finally, in Section C, we briefly consider the
remaining states, none of which have directly considered
the "employee" status of students. State law is at least open
to the possibility of a union of college athletes in a few of
these jurisdictions; in others, however, state law clearly
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forecloses the possibility of any collective bargaining at
public universities.
A. Four Case Studies
1. California. In October 2011, the entire rosters of the
UCLA football and men's basketball teams signed a
petition-circulated by members of the NCPA Players's
Council-urging the NCAA and college presidents to share
a portion of the millions of dollars in recently acquired tv
revenues with college athletes.'9 6 The students' frustration
is understandable: though the UCLA football and men's
basketball programs generated over $34 million in
combined revenues during 2009-2010 season, the average
player's "scholarship shortfall" was between $3488 and
$4461 per year.'97 In announcing the petition, Ramogi
Huma, director of the California-based NCPA, promised
that the petition drive was "the beginning of this strategy,
not the end."'98
If college athletes were to attempt to unionize, there is a
strong possibility they would be successful under existing
California law. In 1978, California enacted the Higher
Education Employer-Employee Relations Act ("HEERA"),
granting broad collective bargaining rights to "employees" of
the University of California ("UC") and California State
University ("CSU") systems.'99 Unlike the NLRA, HEERA
explicitly recognizes that, under certain circumstances, UC
and CSU students may qualify as union-eligible
employees.2 0 In two landmark cases in 1998, the California
196. See Zagier, supra note 21.
197. Ramogi Huma & Ellen J. Staurowsky, Price of Poverty Data, NCPA
NOW.ORG, http://www.ncpanow.org/research?id=0024 (last visited June 14, 2012)
(follow http://www.ncpanow.org/research?id=0024, then follow "Data and
Calculations by Conference" hyperlink). Total revenues ($31.4 million) and
"scholarship shortfalls" ($3482-$4044) for UC-Berkeley's programs were
similar.
198. Zagier, supra note 21.
199. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3560(b) (West 2012).
200. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3562(e) (West 2012) ("'Employee' or 'higher
education employee' means any employee . . . . The board may find student
employees whose employment is contingent on their status as students are
employees only if the services they provide are unrelated to their educational
objectives, or that those educational objectives are subordinate to the services
2012]1 1041
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Public Employee Relations Board ("PERB") ruled that
groups of students at two UC campuses-readers, tutors,
and teaching "associates" at UC-San Diego20 1 and graduate
student instructors, readers, tutors, and part-time learning
skills counselors at UCLA2 0 -met this statutory definition.
Today, the United Auto Workers represents thousands of
members at UC and CSU campuses throughout the state.2 03
As PERB explained in the 1998 cases, HEERA "sets out
a three-part test to determine whether collective bargaining
rights should be extended to student employees."2 First,
the Board asks whether employment is contingent upon the
students' status as enrolled students.2 05 If not, the students
are immediately recognized as "employees" under
HEERA.2 06 Where employment is contingent upon student
status, however, the inquiry proceeds to step two.2 07 At this
stage, "the Board must determine whether the services
provided by student employees are related to their
educational objectives."'208 If the Board finds the labor
provided to be "unrelated to [the students'] educational
objectives, [the students] are employees under HEERA."2 09
they perform and that coverage under this chapter would further the purposes
of this chapter.").
201. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 22 P.E.R.C. 29084, PERB No. 1261-H
(Apr. 23, 1998), 1998 WL 35394392 [hereinafter Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
(ASE- UCSD)].
202. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 23 P.E.R.C. 30025, PERB No. 1301-H
(Dec. 11, 1998), 1998 WL 35395605 [hereinafter Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
(SAGE-UCLA)1.
203. UAW Local 2865 represents over 12,000 student employees at the
University of California. See UAW 2865, http://www.uaw2865.org/ (last visited
June 14, 2012). UAW Local 5810 represents over 6000 postdoctoral fellows
across the University of California. See The Union for Postdocs, UAW 5810,
http://uaw5810.org/ (last visited June 14, 2012). UAW Local 4123 represents
over 6000 student-employees across the California State University system. See
UAW LOCAL 4123, http://www.uaw4123.org/ (last visited June 14, 2012).
204. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. (ASE-UCSD), supra note 201.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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Even if students are providing services related to their
educational objectives, however, they may still be
"employees" under the third part of California's test.210 The
board explained that:
[t]he third part of the test has two-prongs. Under the first prong,
the Board must determine whether the educational objectives of
student employees are subordinate to the services they perform.
Under the second prong, the Board must determine whether
coverage of the student employees under HEERA would further
the purposes of the Act. In order for the Board to conclude that
student employees are employees under HEERA, affirmative
determinations must be made under both prongs.2 11
The flowchart below illustrates California's three-step
analysis.
-, Is employment of
student contingent upon
student sttus?
Are the services
rendered related to the
student's educational
objectives?
*Employee-
under HEERA
N C Employee
under HEERA
services they perform?
Yes Not
-employee-'
under HEERA
(2) Would coverage of rng Ihar
the student finher the
purposes of the Act?
CEtlovee n
ktmderF1EER~
Chart 1-HEERA Student-Employee Test
210. Id.
211. Id.
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In the consolidated 1998 cases, PERB found that the
student-employees' positions were contingent on their
student status and that the services they provided were
related to their educational objectives, but nevertheless
recognized the students as "employees." As the Board
explained:
The Legislature has instructed [us] to look not only at the
students' goals, but also at the services they actually perform, to
see if the students' educational objectives, however personally
important, are nonetheless subordinate to the services they are
required to perform. Thus, even if PERB finds that the students'
motivation for accepting employment was primarily educational,
the inquiry does not end here. PERB must look further-to the
services actually performed-to determine whether the students'
[sic] educational objectives take a back seat to their service
obligations. 1
This test arguably calls for the weighing of
incommensurables: PERB must compare students'
subjective motivations for engaging in an ractivity to the
objective value of the services they provide. But as PERB
explained, this approach reflects California's rejection of the
NLRB's "primary purpose" test, used to deprive students of
their unionization rights based solely on imputed subjective
motivations. 212 "[E]ven if all the student employees
concurred that their purpose in seeking student academic
employment was to further their educational objectives,
[PERB] could still determine that those educational
objectives were subordinate to the value of the services they
provided to the University.2 t Recognizing the considerable
objective value of the student-employees' services to the
university, and declaring that the "extension of collective
bargaining rights [are] . . . consistent with, and in
furtherance of, the expressed purpose of HEERA,"
212. Id.
213. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. (SAGE-UCLA), supra note 202 ("The
Board is not expected to engage in a scientific weighing process, but to exercise
its judgment about which factor--service or educational objectives-is
subordinate.").
214. See infra Part II.B.
215. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. (ASE-UCSD), supra note 201.
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California allowed students at pubic universities to
* * 216unionize.
Under the California test, college athletes at schools
like UCLA and UC-Berkeley should be eligible to
collectively bargain. Participation in NCAA sports is
necessarily contingent on student status (step one), but the
services college athletes provide to universities are wholly
"[unirelated to their educational objectives" (step two).
College athletes are not subject to faculty supervision when
they train and compete, their services are entirely ancillary
to degree requirements, and, as noted in Part I, the
demands of athletics often impede their educational
pursuits. This is a threshold issue: where students provide
services to universities unrelated to their educational
objectives, they are "employees" under California labor
law.217
But even if PERB declared student-athletes' labor to be
related to the students' educational objectives-perhaps
deferring to the NCAA's claim that "intercollegiate athletics
[is] an integral part of the educational program"2 18 -the
balancing test built into step three would likely be availing
for college players. Measured against the economic worth of
the services performed by UCLA and UC-Berkeley athletes
(totaling tens of millions of dollars per year), the
"educational objectives of student employees" in performing
these services are modest, at best. If academic student
employees (tutors, graduate student instructors, etc.)
prevail in step three balancing, it is difficult to see how
college athletes would not.
2. Florida. Florida is another state where several large
public universities operate big-time college sports
programs.2' The University of Florida boasts the largest
216. Id.
217. See id. Depending on the individual student's personal academic goals-
perhaps the student hopes to pursue a career in sports medicine-it is
conceivable that participation in Division I sports could be deemed "related to [a
student's] educational objectives." Id. However, as a class, it is exceedingly hard
to argue that college athletes' labor meaningfully relates to their educational
goals.
218. NCAA DivisIoN I MANUAL, supra note 5, art. 1.3.1, at 1.
219. The University of Florida, Florida State University, University of South
Florida, University of Central Florida, Florida Atlantic University, and Florida
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program, by a comfortable margin, with a football team that
reported over $72.8 million in revenues and $46.5 million in
profits in 2010-2011.220 Under a revenue-sharing plan
loosely based on that negotiated by players' unions in
professional basketball and football, one study estimates
that the average "fair market value" of University of Florida
athletes in both sports would be over $375,000 per year.22 '
As a "right-to-work" state222  with only a 3.1%
unionization rate in the private sector,2 2 3 Florida might
seem an unlikely candidate to pioneer collective bargaining
in college sports. But the Florida Constitution enshrines
collective bargaining for public employees as a fundamental
right under Florida law, 24 and in the public sector, a full
27.8% of Florida workers are covered by union contracts.2 2 5
The robust constitutional and statutory protections afforded
public workers under state law, coupled with the dramatic
profits earned from Division I football in Florida, create a
favorable playing field for college athletes seeking to
unionize. But perhaps most importantly, the idiosyncratic
history of disputes over the "employee" status of students on
Florida campuses has established legal precedent
extraordinarily favorable to student-workers. As a result,
"the rights of graduate assistants to bargain collectively"-
International University are all public universities with NCAA Division I
programs in both football and men's basketball.
220. Office of Postsecondary Education, The Equity in Athletics Data Analysis
Cutting Tool, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., http://ope.ed.gov/athletics/index.aspx (click
"Get data for one institution" or "Get aggregated data for a group of institutions"
and follow the step-by-step instructions once you get to those pages).
221. Huma & Staurowsky, Priceless Poverty Data, supra note 197.
222. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("The rights of persons to work shall not be denied
or abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any labor union or
labor organization. The right of employees, by and through a labor organization,
to bargain collectively shall not be denied or abridged. Public employees shall
not have the right to strike.").
223. Barry T. Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, Union Membership, Coverage,
Density and Employment by State, 2010, GA. STATE UNIV.,
http://unionstats.gsu.edulStateU 2010.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
224. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("The rights of persons to work shall not be denied
or abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any labor union or
labor organization. The right of employees, by and through a labor organization,
to bargain collectively shall not be denied or abridged.").
225. Hirsch & Macpherson, supra note 223.
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and perhaps, by analogy, the rights of college athletes to do
the same-"are now more secure in Florida than in any
other state."2 26
In the mid-1970s, graduate research and teaching
assistants in the Florida state university system petitioned
the Florida Public Employees Relations Commission
("PERC") for recognition of their union.2 27 PERC found the
petitioners to be "public employees" under the "broad" and
"all-embracing" language of Florida's labor law.228 While
acknowledging that graduate assistants were students with
an academic relationship to the university, PERC found
that graduate students also:
[P]erform work for the various universities operated by the Board,
their work is of benefit to the universities for which it is
performed, the work is performed subject to the supervision and
control of professors who are employees of the several universities,
and the work is performed in exchange for the payment of money
by the Board to the Graduate Assistants who perform the work. A
more classic example of an employer-employee relationship can
hardly beimagined.
The Board of Regents countered that graduate
assistants were "primarily" students and "secondarily"
employees, but PERC strongly rejected the relevance of this
226. Grant M. Hayden, "The University Works Because We Do": Collective
Bargaining Rights for Graduate Assistants, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1233, 1243
(2001).
227. United Faculty of Florida, FEA/United and Bd. of Regents, 3 FPER 304,
(Case No. 8H-RC-765-0131, 77E-472) (Nov. 18, 1977), affd Bd. of Regents v.
Pub. Emps. Relations Comm'n, 368 So.2d 641 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
228. Id. at 305.
229. Id. § 447.203(3), Florida Statutes provided that:
Public employee' means any person employed by a public employer
except: (a) Those person appointed by the Governor or elected by the
people. . . (b) Those persons holding positions by appointment or
employment in the organized militia . . . (d) . . . managerial or
confidential employees . . . (e) Those persons holding employment with
the Florida Legislature, (f) . . . inmates confined to institutions within
the state.
The fact that the Florida Legislature itemized certain exceptions to the
statutory definition of "public employee," but not students, militated in favor of
recognizing the graduate assistants as "employees," PERC reasoned. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 447.203(3) (West 2007).
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analysis.23 0 Even if accepted, "[t]here is no such qualification
in the statutory definition [of "public employee"] and the
Commission is without power to fashion one . . . . The fact
that they are students does not detract from the fact that
they are also employees."2 31
In response to the PERC decision, the Florida
Legislature hastily amended the definition of "public
employee" to exclude students.2 3 2 The graduate students'
union, however, (which had since won representational
elections at the University of Florida and the University of
South Florida) challenged the new law as an impermissible
infringement on student-workers' constitutional rights.2 33
Emphasizing the constitutional protections for public sector
collective bargaining in Florida, the court of appeals
embraced the students' argument, finding that only a
"compelling state interest [could] permit such an
abridgement and thereby deny the graduate assistants
collective bargaining rights."2 34
The court, at length, rejected the Regents's argument
that the legislature was justifiably concerned about the
economic impact of allowing graduate assistants to
unionize.23 University officials, the court reasoned, should
not "be protected from bargaining [with student-employees]
because [they] might agree to pay more than [they] should .
. . [I]f concern about higher costs were sufficient reason,
collective bargaining rights could be denied to every
employee and the guarantee of Article I, Section 6, would be
eliminated altogether. "236
The appellate court also revisited the question of
whether students could be "public employees," approving of
230. United Faculty of Florida, supra note 227 at 306.
231. Id. at 306.
232. See United Faculty of Florida v. Bd. of Regents, 417 So. 2d 1055, 1057-58
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (referring to Chapter 81-305, Laws of Florida, codified
as § 447.203(3)(i) (1981)).
233. See id. at 1056.
234. Id. at 1059.
235. Id. at 1059-60.
236. Id. at 1060-61.
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a standard even more favorable to student-athletes.2 3 7
Under Florida law:
[an] "employee" [is one] who for a consideration agrees to work
subject to the orders and direction of another, usually for regular
wages but not necessarily so, and, further, agrees to subject
himself at all times during the period of service to the lawful
orders and directions of the other in respect to the work to be
done.238
The court noted NLRB precedent that found student
workers not to be employees "because as a matter of policy
the NLRB desired to preclude the students from collectively
bargaining."2 39 But federal collective bargaining rights, the
court distinguished, "are not based on a constitutional
guarantee;" in Florida, only a compelling state interest can
justify the deprivation of such rights.2 4
Under the standards articulated in the above cases-
essentially the "common law test" discussed in Part II,
buttressed with constitutional support-college athletes
would likely be found to be "public employees." The athletes
labor "subject to the orders and direction" of university
staff; they do so "for a consideration" that need not be
regular wages; and (much more so than ordinary employees)
they agree to follow "the lawful orders and directions of [the
employer] in respect to the work to be done."2 4' PERC's
strong rejection of the "primary purpose" test and its
unwillingness to fashion exceptions to the statutory
definition also weigh heavily in favor of college athletes. But
perhaps most important, if PERC were to recognize college
athletes as "public employees," it would be exceedingly
difficult to overturn this holding legislatively. Because
237. Id. at 1058.
238. Id. (quoting City of Boca Raton v. Mattef, 91 So. 2d 644, 647 (Fla. 1956))
(emphasis added).
239. Id. at 1059 (distinguishing St. Clare's Hosp., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1997)).
240. Id. Later Florida labor cases have built on this language, and have shown
even more skepticism toward efforts to curtail public employees' bargaining
rights. See, e.g., Chiles v. State Emps. Attorneys Guild, 734 So. 2d 1030, 1033
(Fla. 1999) ("[In order to survive a constitutional challenge, [a restriction on
collective bargaining] 'must serve that compelling state interest in the least
intrusive means possible.'").
241. See United Faculty of Florida, 417 So. 2d at 1058.
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public employees' collective bargaining rights are
constitutional in Florida, only a compelling state interest-
something far more compelling than the universities'
economic interest in not paying athletes-would suffice.
3. Michigan. College athletes might also receive
favorable treatment in a state with a much stronger
pedigree of cutting edge unionism: Michigan. 2 At both the
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor and Michigan State
University, college athletics are major industries. During
the 2010-2011 season, the two schools' football programs
netted approximately $74 million in profits; their men's
basketball programs brought in another $11 million.2 43
During the 2011 season, an average of 112,179 spectators
packed Michigan Stadium each Saturday to watch the
football squad compete.24
The Michigan Employment Relations Commission
("MERC") and Michigan courts have repeatedly ruled on
labor disputes involving student-workers, and historically
has been sympathetic to student-worker unionism. In 1973,
the Supreme Court of Michigan became the first state
supreme court to rule that interns, residents, and post-
doctoral fellows at the University of Michigan Hospitals
were "employees" under state law. The court unanimously
held that "[n]o exception is made for people who have a dual
status of students and employees" under Michigan's Public
Employees Relations Act ("PERA"), and that if "the
242. See Ahmed A. White, The Depression Era Sit-Down Strikes and the
Limits of Liberal Labor Law, 40 SETON HALL L. REv. 1, 2, 13-16 (2010). For a
historical discussion of the Wagner Act, see also Karl E. Klare, Judicial
Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal
Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 265-70 (1978).
243. See Office of Postsecondary Education, supra note 220.
244. Gary Johnson, NCAA Attendance Hits New High, NCAA.coM (Jan. 26,
2012), http://www.ncaa.com/news/football/article/2012-01-26/ncaa-attendance-
hits-new-high. The University of Michigan also holds the record for most
consecutive 100,000-plus crowds (244), a streak that dates to November 8, 1975.
2011 NCAA Football Attendance Records, NCAA, 11, fs.ncaa.org/
Docs /stats /footballrecords/2011 /Attendance.pdf.
245. Regents of the Univ. of Michigan v. Michigan Emp't Relations Comm'n,
204 N.W.2d 218, 224 (Mich. 1973).
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Legislature had intended to exclude students/employees ...
they could have written such an exception into the law."2 4
In 1981, MERC found that graduate students serving as
teaching and staff assistants were "employees," as well, but
significantly for our purposes, held that research assistants
were not." The distinction, the commission explained,
hinged on the "academic relevance" of the students' work,
and whether "the performance of services [is principally] for
the benefit of another." Teaching and staff assistants were
"admittedly . . . 'principally students,"' but focus on the
"specific services [they] rendered" revealed them to be
"employees" under Michigan law.248 The labor of research
assistants, on the other hand, was almost always
"academically relevant"249 to the students' own research
agendas. Thus, MERC concluded that such students' were
acting principally as their "own masters" when they
engaged in research-"like the student in the classroom"-
rather than as employees of the university."'
An analysis that emphasizes the "academic relevance"
of the disputed labor, while unfavorable to graduate
researchers, militates strongly for the "employee" status of
college athletes. Michigan athletes are plainly providing
extraordinarily valuable "services . . . for the benefit of
another," and enjoy little autonomy in doing so. Even if big-
time college athletes were regarded as the principal
beneficiaries of their own labor-an apt characterization of
intramural competitors, perhaps, but not NCAA Division I
athletes-MERC's focus on the "academic relevance" 25 1 of
their labor is critical. Plainly, college athlete's on-the-field
exertions have only the most tangential relevance to their
academic pursuits.
246. Id. at 225; see also Regents of the Univ. of Michigan and Graduate Emps.
Org., Case No. C76 K-370, 1981 MERC Lab. Op. 777, 782 ("Although PERA does
not define public employees to specifically include or exclude students, MERC
has consistently held that students can be employees.").
247. Regents of the Univ. of Michigan, 1981 MERC Lab Op. at 780.
248. Id. at 784-86.
249. Id. at 810.
250. Id. at 785.
251. Id.
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Additionally promising for Michigan college athletes is
MERC precedent holding that undergraduate students may
be "public employees" under PERA, too.252 In 1976, a group
of undergraduate students employed part time through
Michigan State University's "student employment office"
petitioned MERC for recognition.25 3 The commission noted
that the university made these positions available, in part,
to "help defray the cost of [the students'] education," and
that the jobs were generally "interim or temporary."254
Nevertheless, MERC held that the students were employees
under PERA, "even though their principal vocation is that
of a student."2 55 If an undergraduate student assigned to
clerical or maintenance tasks in the athletics department
qualifies as an "employee," it is difficult to rationalize why a
classmate whose scholarship requires him to compete before
110,000 paying spectators should not.
4. Nebraska. On game days, Memorial Stadium in
Lincoln, Nebraska becomes not only the center of the
University of Nebraska community, but also the "third-
largest 'city' in the state."2 56 After long-time head coach Tom
Osborne stepped down in 1997, voters rewarded him with
three terms in the U.S. House of Representatives, and he
remains one of the most popular figures in the state.25 7 As
Osborne's enduring popularity suggests, Cornhuskers
football is serious business: the team generates $55 million
in revenues and $35 million in annual profits. But even that
reported sum may undercount the true financial value of
Nebraska's football program.2 5 8 In order to purchase season
tickets, for example, Nebraska alumni must make an
additional "donation" to the school, ranging from $500 per
252. Michigan State Univ. and Michigan State Univ. Student Workers, Case
No. R75 D-197, 1976 MERC Lab Op. 73, 80; see also infra Part III.B. (discussing
undergraduate unions in Oregon and Massachusetts).
253. Id. at 74.
254. Id. at 77-78.
255. Id. at 80.
256. Greg Skidmore, Payment for College Football Players in Nebraska, 41
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 319, 323 (2004).
257. See Tom Osborne to Be Honored, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Dec. 9, 2004;
Press Release, Public Policy Polling, Nebraskans Favor Civil Unions, Osborne
Universally Admired (Oct. 13, 2011) (noting Osborne's 86% favorability rating).
258. See Office of Postsecondary Education, supra note 220.
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seat (for obstructed-view tickets) to $3500 per seat (for a
fifty-yard-line vantage). 25 9 Football players apparently serve
as an effective auxiliary for the university's development
office: the 82,000-seat Memorial Stadium has sold out for
every home game since 1962.26
Beyond the highly commercialized nature of its college
football program, though, Nebraska merits closer attention
from college athletes for two reasons: (1) long-standing legal
precedent favoring student-workers, and (2) noteworthy
support from the state legislature for Nebraska college
athletes. While graduate students employed as teaching and
research assistants have never petitioned the Nebraska
Commission of Industrial Relations ("CIR") for recognition,
the Supreme Court of Nebraska reached "the obvious
conclusion" some thirty-five years ago that individuals may
be "both students and employees of the University of
Nebraska" for unionization purposes.26 ' Without specifying
the precise test that would govern for Nebraska law, the
court noted that Nebraska's statutory definition of public
"employee" is broad,26 2 and found "nothing in the stated
purpose of the [Nebraska collective bargaining] act that
would indicate that the Legislature intended that persons
who are students but also employees of the University of
Nebraska should be exempted . . . ."263 Nebraska's highest
court thus became the second state supreme court (after
Michigan's) to rule that student-employees were entitled to
unionize; two decades later, the NLRB would cite
259. 2012 Nebraska Football Season Ticket Application, www.huskers.
com/pdf8/770907.pdf?DBOEMID=100 (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). Such
arrangements are common for top-ranked programs. After a successful 2007
season, for example, the University of Georgia began charging alumni an
unprecedented $10,651 donation to purchase season tickets for football games,
though this sum fell dramatically in subsequent years along with the team's on-
field success. See CLOTFELTER, supra note 6, at 100.
260. 2012 Football Ticket Waitlist, HUSKERS ATHLETIC FUND,
http://huskersathleticfund.com/2012-football-ticket-waitlist/?DBOEMID=100
(last visited Apr. 21, 2012).
261. House Officers Ass'n v. Univ. of Nebraska Med. Ctr., 255 N.W.2d 258, 261
(Neb. 1977).
262. Id. at 262 ("Employee shall include any person employed by any [public]
employer.. . .") (citing NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-801(5) (2004)).
263. Id.
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Nebraska's decision in its Boston Medical Center opinion
discussed in Part II.B.2 64
Perhaps as significant, though, is the marked support
college athletes have received from state lawmakers. In
2003, the legislature considered Legislative Bill 688, "AN
ACT relating to the University of Nebraska-Lincoln; to
provide for paying . . . persons competing in intercollegiate
athletics."26 Noting that "[m]any players are recruited from
impoverished families" and that "[m]aintaining a winning
football team has become an integral aspect of the overall
business or occupation of the university," the legislature
found that "football players are entitled to some tangible
return for the strenuous work they perform and the revenue
they generate for the benefit of the university."2 66 Without
setting a specific dollar amount, the law declared that, "in
the same manner that nonathlete students are compensated
for performing various tasks while student, football players
shall be entitled to fair financial compensation for playing
football."267 The final version of the bill, which passed 26-9
and was signed by the governor,26 8 contained a critical
proviso: the measure would not become "operative" until
four other states with Big Twelve football programs passed
similar laws. Nevertheless, the broad support for the
measure illustrates an important point: political branches
in several states appear prepared to support recognition of
college athletes as "employees.
264. Boston Med. Ctr., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 163 (1999).
265. L.B. 688, 98 Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2003), available at http://www.
legislature.ne.gov/floordocs/98/pdflfinal/1b688.pdf.
266. Id. A Statement of Intent accompanying the bill further explains: "Just as
the Declaration of Independence spelled out a detailed bill of particulars
justifying the separation of the American colonies from England, LB 688 sets
forth very precise and specific reasons that lead inexorably to the conclusion
that University of Nebraska-Lincoln football players are entitled to
compensation . . . ." Senator Ernie Chambers, Introducer's Statement of Intent,
L.B. 688, 98 Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2003) (Feb. 10, 2003).
267. L.B. 688, supra note 265.
268. Legislative Research Div., Neb. Legislature, A Review: Ninety-Eight
Legislature, First Session, 2003, 27-28 (July 2003).
269. In 2010, California's legislature overwhelmingly passed the "Student-
Athletes' Right to Know Act," requiring recruiters to "disclose, among other
things, institutional and NCAA policies on medical expenses, scholarship
renewals, and transfers for athletes." Libby Sander, In California, 'Athletes'
1054 [Vol. 60
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B. Additional States that have Recognized Student-Worker
Unions
Under a variety of collective bargaining laws, twelve
other states now recognize unions of student-workers at
public universities. In all but two of these states (Minnesota
and Washington), the opinions issued by state labor boards
and courts appear to support the contention that student-
athletes would also qualify as statutory "employees." The
following Section surveys the myriad approaches and
analyses the states have adopted.
1. Other Balancing Test States (Kansas, Illinois). The
Kansas Public Employees Relations Board ("PERB")
recognized graduate teaching assistants as "employees" 27 0
under the state's collective bargaining law in 1994.2' Like
California's PERB, the Kansas board applies an intricate,
multipart balancing test to "resolve the student/employee
issue."2 72 This inquiry similarly looks to whether the
Rights' Measure Becomes Law, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 1, 2010,
http://chronicle.com/blogs/players/in-california-athletes-rights-measure-
becomes-law/27359. Connecticut passed a similar measure in June 2011, and
more aggressive bills based on NCPA model legislation are expected in 2012 in
Indiana and California. Pat Eaton-Robb, Laws Force Disclosure of Scholarships'
Fine Print, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 25, 2011; NCPA, California and Indiana
Lawmakers to Push Athletes Bill of Rights (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.
ncpanow.org/releasesadvisories?id=0020.
270. Under Kansas law, a "public employee" is "any person employed by any
public agency, except those persons classed as supervisory employees,
professional employees of school districts ... elected and management officials,
and confidential employees." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4322(a) (West 2012).
271. Kansas Ass'n of Pub. Emps. v. Kansas Bd. of Regents, No. 75-UD-1-1992,
1994 WL 16779818, at *24 (PERB Oct. 17, 1994).
272. Id. at *14. ("The first part of the process involves a balancing test to
weigh the significance of the educational objectives against the importance of
the services rendered. On the 'educational objectives' side of the scale, the Board
should consider: (1) the subjective motivation of the [petitioners] for
participating in the [activity]; (2) the employer's treatment of [the petitioners] as
students as evidenced by faculty and administrative statements and conduct;
and (3) indicia of student status. On the 'services' side of the scale, PERB should
consider the following: (1) indicia of employee status; (2) the employer's
treatment of [the petitioners] as employees as shown by faculty and
administrative statements and conduct; and (3) agency principles of master-
servant. If this balancing test shows [the petitioners'] educational objectives to
be subordinate to the services they perform, PERB should proceed to the second
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students' "educational objectives are subordinate to the
services they perform."2 7 If so, the student must also
establish that "granting collective bar aining rights . . .
would further the purposes of PEERA." 2 In the alternative,
the Kansas PERB suggested the board might also apply a
"guiding purpose" test with similar result. 27 Under this test:
The focus is on factors which indicate the program is operating to
benefit the student, (i.e. is educational), as opposed to such benefit
being more for the employer and only incidental to the student,(i.e. business based). Where the 'guiding purpose' is educational
(i.e. primarily oriented toward providing education), the students
are not 'public employees' within the PEERA definition. However,
where the 'guiding purpose' is typically business-based, (i.e. where
the educational purposes are subordinate to routine business
considerations), the students are employees.276
For reasons outlined in the discussion of California's
statute, college athletes-like Kansas's graduate teaching
assistants-have a strong claim to employee status under
either test.
In _Illinois, the Educational Labor Relations Board
("IELRB") has also recognized student-workers as
"employees," despite the statutory language explicitly
excluding "student[s]" from those eligible to unionize.
After agitation by teaching assistants, research assistants,
and graduate assistants at the University of Illinois in 1998,
the board found that relying on the plain meaning of the
word "student" (one who is enrolled for study at a school)
would conflict with the purpose of the collective bargaining
law and produce "absurd results."2 7 8 Through a creative
step of the process: an assessment of whether granting collective bargaining
rights ... would further the purposes of the Act.").
273. Id.
274. Id. at *20.
275. Id. at *23 (emphasis in original).
276. Id.
277. See 115 ILL. Comp. STAT. 5/2(b) (West 2011) ("'Educational employee' or
'employee' means any individual, excluding supervisors, managerial, confidential,
short term employees, student, and part-time academic employees of community
colleges employed full or part time by an educational employer.. . .").
278. Graduate Emps. Org. v. Illinois Educ. Labor Relations Bd., 733 N.E.2d
759, 764 (Ill. 2000).
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reading of the act, the board announced that the "student
exemption" was meant only as a bar against the
unionization of students qua students, and that
unionization of students qua workers was permissible.2 79
The central inquiry, IELRB explained, is whether the
students' labor is "significantly connected to their status as
students .1280 This "significant connection" test,281 which the
Illinois courts have endorsed, focuses on the degree to which
the work performed is related to students' academic duties:
"[t]o say ... that [a particular form of work] is significantly
connected to the student status of an individual [merely]
because it is a form of financial aid is . . . clearly
erroneous."28 2 Thus, the fact that college athletes must be
enrolled students to compete, or that college athletes'
scholarships enable their academic pursuits, is insufficient
to establish a "significant connection" under Illinois law. As
the IELRB later elaborated, students "who work within
their discipline are presumptively within the student
exclusion;" students "who do not work within their
discipline are presumptively not within the student
exclusion."28 3 Illinois's test bears certain similarities to
Michigan's emphasis on the "academic relevance" of the
contested services, and for the similar reasons to those
outlined above, it appears highly favorable to college
athletes.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. The Illinois courts also considered and rejected using a "primary purpose"
test, explaining that such a standard would improperly exclude too few students
from collective bargaining. Under Illinois' version of the "primary purpose" test,
graduate assistants would be considered "students" (and thus be ineligible for
collective bargaining) where "the primary purpose of [their work], as established
through objective evidence, was in furtherance of their educations." The
"significant connection" test thus contemplates a somewhat broader definition of
"student," encompassing those whose work duties are not primarily (though still
significantly) in furtherance of their education. Id. at 763.
282. Id. at 765.
283. Bd. of Trs. and Graduate Emps. Org., 4-5, Case No. 96-RC-0013-S, Mar.
27, 2001. [On file with author]. The presumption that an individual working in
their discipline is an excluded "student" (i.e., not an "employee") can be rebutted
with "clear and convincing evidence that the primary duties performed . . . are
peripheral to, and thus unrelated to, teaching or research duties." Id. at 4.
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2. Voluntary Recognition States (New Jersey, New York,
Rhode Island). Public university officials in several states
opted not to contest whether students seeking to organize
were "public employees" under state law; these universities
may have longer histories of student unions on campus, but
have fewer precedents to guide determinations on college
athletes. In New Jersey, for example, Rutgers University
voluntarily recognized its graduate assistants2 8 soon after
the passage of the New Jersey Employer-Employee
Relations Act in 1968.285 Likewise in New York, when SUNY
graduate assistants and teaching assistants petitioned for
recognition under the Public Employees' Fair Employment
Act,6 "the State concede [d] that an employment
relationship exist[ed] between the GAs and TAs and the
State."28 7 And when graduate students in Rhode Island first
284. See Rutgers Univ., P.E.R.C. No. 76-13, 7, 1976 NJ PERC LEXIS 44 (Jan.
23, 1976).
285. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-3(d) (West 2010) ("The term 'employee' shall
include. . . . any public employee, i.e., any person holding a position, by
appointment or contract, or employment in the service of a public employer ...
except elected officials, members of boards and commissions, managerial
executives and confidential employees.").
The New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission (NJ PERC) had
occasion to address the student-employee issue later, however, in a 1981 opinion
involving students hired as "Residence Counselors." The commission explained
that "the statutory definition of employee is very broad and its exceptions are
very specific. . . . . [Tihe term 'student' and 'employee' are not mutually
exclusive." Despite finding the students to be "employees," however, NJ PERC
concluded that "affording [the students] the right to collective negotiations
would [not] effectuate the purposes of the Act." This mixed approach leaves the
counselors in the peculiar position of lacking a recognized bargaining unit, but
enjoying the ability to "avail themselves of the unfair practice jurisdiction of the
Commission when their rights are violated." Rutgers Univ., P.E.R.C. No. 82-55,
5, 7, 10 n.10, 1981 NJ PERC Lexis 325 (Dec. 17, 1981).
286. See N.Y. Crv. SERV. LAW § 201(7)(a) (McKinney 2011) (defines "public
employee" as "any person holding a position by appointment or employment in
the service of a public employer. . . .").
287. Commc'ns Workers of Am. 24 PERB 3035 (1991). The State argued,
however, that graduate students should be prohibited from collective bargaining
because they lacked a "regular and substantial" employment relationship with
the State and because "the Legislature intended to exclude [this sort ofl
employment relationship from coverage" under New York's Public Employees'
Fair Employment Act. The board rejected both arguments. See also Long Island
Coll. Hosp., 33 N.Y.S.L.R.B. 161, 172-73 (1970) (recognizing medical house staff
as employees).
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organized in 2002, students reached a "consent agreement"
with University of Rhode Island ("URI") officials prior to
holding a union election.2 88 While applicable precedent is
limited, each of these states' expansive definitions of
"employee" under state law, coupled with state labor boards'
past recogition of student-workers, may favor college
athletes.28
3. States with Undergraduate Unions (Oregon,
Massachusetts). Graduate students in Oregon and
Massachusetts also enjoy "employee" status, but-
significantly for college athletes-labor boards in these
states (like Michigan) have also explicitly recognized
undergraduate students as employees of their universities.
When the Oregon Public Employee Relations Board
("PERB") first formed in 1970, its first opinion was a
"direct[ion] that [a union representation] election be held for
part-time student employees" working as dining hall staff at
the University of Oregon.29 0 The university signed a contract
with the union of 250 undergraduates eighteen months
later, which was "believed to be U the first negotiated by an
all-student group within AFSCME."2 9 1 Five years later, in a
case establishing the "employee" status of most graduate
288. Univ. of Rhode Island, R.I.S.L.R.B., Case No. EE-3649 (Apr. 22, 2002).
See R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-7-3(3) (defining "employees"); see also Agreement
Between Rhode Island Board of Governors for Higher Education and Graduate
Assistants United / American Association of University Professors (GAU /
AAUP) 2007-2010, 5 (2007-2010), http://www.uri.edulunion/gaul
content uploads/contract.pdf ("The Board recognizes the GAU, URI/AAUP as
the sole and exclusive representative of all Graduate Assistants and Graduate
Research Assistants employed at the University of Rhode Island, as certified by
the Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board on April 22, 2002.").
289. The graduate student union at the University of Iowa was also formed by
stipulation of the parties, but because of Iowa's unique statutory approach to
defining "employee," we address it separately below. University officials at the
University of Wisconsin similarly "voluntarily" recognized the country's first
graduate student union in 1969, though only after a bitter, month-long strike.
See Arlen Christenson, Collective Bargaining in a University: The University of
Wisconsin and the Teaching Assistants Association, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 210, 210-
11 (1971).
290. BNA, Oregon PERB Issues Initial Decision, Directing AFSCME Election
for University Student Food Service Workers, Gov'T EMP. REL. REP., GERR No.
345, B-2 (Apr. 20, 1970).
291. BNA, University of Oregon, AFSCME Sign Pact For Part-Time Student
Workers, GOV'T EMP. REL. REP., GERR No. 415, B-26 (Aug. 23, 1971).
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teaching fellows, the Employee Relations Board (the
successor to PERB) concluded that the central factor in
distinguishing students from employees was whether the
"activities are [or are not] required for [the graduate
students'] advanced degree [s]."292 Athletic labor of
undergraduate college athletes is, of course, no more
essential to the completion of an academic degree than the
services provided by undergraduate dining hall workers.
The single most promising case for college athletes,
however, may be a unanimous 2002 opinion issued by the
Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission ("MLC")
allowing 350 undergraduate "resident assistants" ("RAs") to
unionize at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst.2 9 3
While college athletes and RAs provide very different types
of services to their university, the two groups' employment
relationships share significant similarities. Only enrolled
undergraduate students are permitted to serve as Ras;29 4
they undergo a mandatory training program before the start
292. Univ. of Oregon Graduate Teaching Fellows Fed'n, 2 P.E.C.B.R. 1039
(Feb. 1977).
293. Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Massachusetts, Case No. SCR-01-2246, at 39
(Jan. 18, 2002); see also Bd. of Trs., 20 MLC 1454, 1462-64 (1994) (recognizing
graduate teaching and research assistants as "public employees" under "broad
and encompassing" definition provided in M.G.L. c.150E); City of Quincy
Library Dep't, 3 MLC 1517, 1518 (1977) ("full-time students who perform part-
time work for an employer separate and apart from their educational
responsibilities are not precluded from exercising collective bargaining rights
because of their student status or because their turnover rate may be higher
than that of other employees."); MASSACHUSETTS LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
A GUIDE TO THE MASSACHUSETTS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LAW
IV-8, IV-9 (2002) ("The Commission has broadly interpreted the terms
'employee' or 'public employee' to encompass all individuals employed by a
public employer, except those specifically excluded. The Commission has defined
"employee" to include: regularly employed part-time employees, part-time
reserve police officers, per diem substitute teachers, call fire fighters, visiting
lecturers, full-time students [citing Quincy Library Department], graduate
teaching and research assistants, and undergraduate resident assistants . . .
(citations omitted).
294. Compare Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Massachusetts, Case No. SCR-01-2246, at
8 (Jan. 18, 2002), with NCAA, 2009-10 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 127 (2009)
(providing the academic eligibility requirements), available at
http://www.ncaapubli-cations.com/productdownloads/Dl10.pdf.
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of the fall semester;29 5 and RAs must "maintain at least a 2.2
cumulative GPA" to remain eligible for their positions.2 9 6 On
paper, RAs are expected to work approximately twenty
hours per week,29 7 though in reality the demands of the
position may consume far more of the students' time.298 RAS
serve pursuant to one-year agreements, which the
university generally renews "[b]arring . . . poor
performance" or failure by the student to "maintain [] the
minimum GPA."2" And in exchange for these services, RAs'
chief form of compensation is "a waiver of the charge for
[dormitory housing], valued at $3,286;" the students also
receive a waiver of certain computer fees ($36), a waiver of a
gym membership fee ($100), and a "cash stipend" of
$1709.86.3" In each of these regards, undergraduate RAs
strongly resemble college athletes.
The legal rationale for recognizing the RA union-and
the university's arguments that the MLC rejected-is
highly applicable to undergraduate college athletes, as well.
The commission acknowledged that undergraduate RAs
undoubtedly "acquire some important life skills as a result
of holding this position," yet expressed no reservations
about recognizing RAs' "fee waivers" as a form of
compensation for services rendered.3 0 1 University officials
295. Compare Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Massachusetts, supra note 294, at 10, with
McCormick & McCormick, Myth, supra note 22, at 102-03 (describing pre-
season training requirements).
296. Compare Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Massachusetts, supra note 294, with
NCAA, supra note 294, at 127-28 (providing the requirements for good academic
standing).
297. Compare Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Massachusetts, supra note 294, at 11, with
NCAA, supra note 294, at 216 (establishing a "20 hour" rule).
298. Compare Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Massachusetts, supra note 294, at 11, with
McCormick & McCormick, Myth, supra note 22, at 98-101 n.127 (detailing
actual time commitments of Division I athletic competition).
299. Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Massachusetts, supra note 294, at 15. Under new
NCAA guidelines, universities may provide four-year athletic scholarships,
though these may be revoked for poor academic performance or other violations
of university rules. Most college athletes, however, like RAs, receive one-year
renewable agreements that can also be rescinded for poor performance. See
Bennett, supra note 159.
300. Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Massachusetts, supra note 294, at 11. But cf supra
Part I.C. (describing forms of compensation for college athletes).
301. Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Massachusetts, supra note 294, at 25, 28.
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argued "that, because RAs' hiring and continued
employment is dependent upon their student attributes, i.e.
maintaining a minimum GPA and otherwise acting as
exemplary student role models, it would be impossible to
separate its student relationship with them from its
employment relationship."3 02 But the MLC ultimately
dismissed this argument, emphasizing that "the actual
work performed" was "not primarily educational and
therefore not as inextricably tied in with their student
status as the University contends."30 3 "The fact that one
must be a student to obtain and maintain employment does
not vitiate the student's legitimate interest in his or her
terms and conditions of employment," the commission
concluded, "particularly where, as here, the vast majority of
those terms and conditions are totally divorced from the
student's academic endeavors."3 0
4. States Favoring Graduate Assistants, But Disfavoring
College Athletes (Minnesota, Washington). Not all states
recognizing graduate assistants as "employees" will be as
favorable to undergraduate attempts to unionize, however.
Minnesota's Public Employment Labor Relations Act, for
example, explicitly allows "all graduate assistants who are
enrolled in the graduate school and who hold the rank of
research assistant [or] teaching assistant" to collectively
bargain with the university.0 Included in the list of
categorical exclusions, however, are "full-time
undergraduate students employed by the school which they
attend under a work-study program or in connection with
the receipt of financial aid, irrespective of number of hours
of service per week."3" This provision would appear to bar
any attempt by athletes to unionize at the University of
Minnesota.
College athletes would face similar challenges in
Washington. There, in response to a contentious and
disruptive organizing campaign,30 7 the Washington
302. Id. at 27.
303. Id. at 27-28.
304. Id. at 32.
305. MINN. STAT. § 179A.11(1)(10) (2006).
306. § 179A.03(14)(i).
307. See Gordon Lafer, Graduate Student Unions: Organizing in a Changed
Academic Economy, 28 LAB. STUD. J. 25, 36-37 (2003); Jane Hadley, TA strike
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Legislature passed a law conferring bargaining rights on
certain "employees enrolled in an academic program" at the
University of Washington.3 0 8 While a colorable argument
could be made that the graduate assistants were already
"employees" entitled to collectively bargain before the
legislation,3 0 subsequent decisions by the Washington
Public Employment Relations Commission ("PERC") have
rejected this argument. On several occasions, PERC has
since explained that the 2002 bill "extend[ed] statutory
collective bargaining rights (for the first time) to
student/employees . . . ."3 This understanding of the pre-
existing status quo is critical for college athletes, since it
means that only students whose "duties and responsibilities
are substantially equivalent to those employees in" specified
academic labor positions may join statutorily authorized
bargaining units. " Washington's scheme thus establishes a
unique standard: whereas in many states college athletes
may be able to unionize precisely because their labor is
divorced from academics, in Washington, this fact likely
precludes their union eligibility.
5. Other Approaches (Iowa, Pennsylvania, Montana).
Iowa's Public Employment Relations Act of 1974 ("PERA")
ending with quarter at UW: But union says walkout could resume in fall,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 14, 2001, at B.
308. WASH. REV. CODE § 41.56.203 (2006); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
41.56.205(1) (West 2008) (later extending similar rights Washington State
University students). On the effective date of the new law, graduate students at
the University of Washington successfully petitioned for a union election. See
Graduate Student Emp. Action Coal., UAW v. Univ. of Washington, Case No.
16288-E-02-2699 (Dec. 16, 2003), available at http://www.perc.wa.gov/
databases/rep uc/08315.htm [hereinafter PERC Decision 83151.
309. The union, in fact, made this argument before passage of the 2002
legislation, but University of Washington officials and the state's attorney
general strongly disputed their interpretation. See Ruth Schubert, Legal opinion
increases chances of strike at UW, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER (May 16, 2001,
10:00 PM), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Legal-opinion-increases-
chances-of-strike-at-UW-1054940.php.
310. PERC Decision 8315, supra note 308, at 6. See also UAW Local 4121 v.
Univ. of Washington, Case No. 22639-C-09-1411 (Aug. 22, 2011), http://www.
perc.wa.gov/databases/repuc/11139.htm [hereinafter PERC Decision 111391
("In 2002, the Washington State Legislature extended statutory collective
bargaining rights to studentlemployees working in specific classifications at the
University of Washington.") (emphasis added).
311. See PERC Decision 11139, supra note 310, at 3 (quoting § 41.56.203).
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similarly permits collective bargaining by graduate students
who are "engaged in academically related employment as a
teaching, research, or service assistant."3 12 In contrast to
Washington, however, Iowa's statute also contemplates
collective bargaining by (at least some) other student-
workers.3 13 Under PERA, among those excluded from the
definition of "public employee" are:
Students working as part-time public employees twenty hours per
week or less, except graduate or other postgraduate students in
preparation for a profession who are engaged in academically
related employment as a teaching, research, or service
assistant.314
The exclusion thus contemplates that "students" who
are not "graduate students" (presumably undergraduates)
may be public employees, but not those who work "part-time
... twenty hours per week or less." As discussed in Part I,
the college athletes at the University of Iowa and Iowa
State University almost certainly satisfy this time-
requirement threshold. But this, of course, still does not
resolve the meaning of "public employee" under Iowa law.
Because PERA expressly allows graduate students to
unionize, Iowa's Public Employee Relations Board ("PERB")
and courts have had limited opportunity to elaborate on the
question in the university setting.3 15 In other contexts,
312. IOWA CODE § 20.4 (2011).
313. Id. (exempting some graduate students-those not engaged in
academically related positions-from the definition of public employees that are
granted collective bargaining rights).
314. Id.
315. The Campaign to Organize Graduate Students (COGS) first organized at
the University of Iowa in the mid-1990s, and PERB approved a "Stipulation of
Bargaining Unit" agreed to by both the students and the university. Excluded
from the union-eligible group were those whose:
appointments are (a) primarily a means of financial aid which do not
require the individuals to provide services to the University, or (b)
which are primarily intended as learning experiences which contribute
to the students' progress toward their graduate or professional program
of study, or (c) for which the students receive academic credit.
Univ. of Iowa Bd. of Regents and Campaign to Organize Graduate Students,
Case No. 4959, Bargaining Unit Determination, 1, 1 (Jan. 31, 1994); Univ. of
Iowa and United Elec., Radio & Machine Workers of Am., Local 896 (COGS),
Case No. 5463, Order of Certification, 1,2 (May 6, 1996).
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however, the Supreme Court of Iowa has held that PERA "is
written in broad language so as to allow a large number of
public employees to be eligible for coverage under the Act . .
. We will read the exclusions under section 20.4 narrowly to
promote the Act's broad application."3 16
Lastly, there are two states, Pennsylvania and
Montana, where, although it is difficult to discern a precise
"test" applied in dealing with student-workers, state labor
boards appear to emphasize the "literal" or "plain"
meanings of the term (i.e., some version of the common law
right-of-control test). In first recognizing graduate
assistants at Temple University as "employees" in 2000, the
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board ("PLRB") announced
that it "subscribe [d] to the analysis set forth in the NLRB's
decision in Boston Medical Center."3 17 As discussed in Part
II.B, the NLRB in that case emphasized the "broad . . .
[literal]" definition of "employee," and explained that the
term in § 2(3) of the Act should be understood as "an out-
growth of the common law concept of the 'servant.'"3 " PERB
subsequently reemphasized:
There is no requirement [here] that a graduate student perform
graduate assistant work in order to obtain a graduate degree. The
graduate assistants receive no academic credit for their
performance of graduate assistant work ... [G]raduate assistants
receive compensation from the Employer in the form of
stipends/pay and tuition and book allowances and are required to
perform services for the Employer in exchange for that
compensation, evidencing an employer-employee relationship.
These basic dynamics hold-indeed, are even plainer-
in the case of college athletes.3 2 0
316. Iowa Ass'n of Sch. Bds v. Iowa P.E.R.B., 400 N.W. 2d 571 (Iowa 1987)
(citation omitted).
317. Emps. of Temple Univ., No. P.E.R.A.-R-99-58-E, 2000 WL 35899093 (Pa.
Labor Relations Bd. Oct. 17, 2000).
318. See Boston Med. Ctr., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 159 (1999).
319. Emps. of Temple Univ., No. P.E.R.A.-R-99-58-E, 2001 WL 36365345 (Pa.
Labor Relations Bd. Aug. 21, 2001) (providing Final Order of Certification).
320. PERB also approvingly quoted from Boston Medical Center in responding
to university officials' arguments that traditional labor law was ill-suited for
student-workers. "If there is anything we have learned in the long history of this
Act, it is that unionism and collective bargaining are dynamic institutions
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Montana became the latest state to recognize graduate
assistants as "employees" under state law in November
2011, and similarly announced an expansive interpretation
of the word "employee."321  Like Pennsylvania's PERB,
Montana's Board of Personnel Appeals ("BPA") found that
"the plain meaning of the statute," which defines "public
employee" as "a person employed by a public employer in
any capacity,"3 2 2 includes graduate assistants.3 23 "In every
common meaning of the term," the hearing officer's opinion
explained, graduate assistants "are employees of the
university when they are performing their GA duties."3 24
A unique aspect of the Montana case relevant to college
athletes is the university's use of preappointment
"Agreement Forms" signed by all graduate assistants. Just
as NCAA officials deliberately revised language in grant-in-
aid agreements to downplay their similarity to employment
contracts,3 2 5 Montana State University officials required
graduate assistants to sign a statement reading:
This appointment is NOT A CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT. For
this appointment to remain in force, the Graduate Assistant must
be in good standing (GPA>3.0) . . . [Tihe University reserves the
capable of adjusting to new and changing work contexts and demands in every
sector of our evolving economy." Id.
321. Graduate Emp. Org., MEA-MFT v. Montana State Univ., Case No. 1020-
2011 (Nov. 2012), available at http://dli.mt.gov/hearings/decisions/2011/
cbdecl020_2011.pdf [hereinafter Unit Determination No. 4-2011].
322. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-103(9) (2007).
323. See Unit Determination No. 4-2011, supra note 321, at 5, 22. Montana's
Board of Personnel Appeals adopted these findings in relevant part several
months later.
324. Id. at 4.
325. Former NCAA director Walter Byers' memoir recounts how, after the
early worker's compensations cases, the NCAA worried
[t]hese oral and written commitments were perilously close to
employment contracts. [We] suggested [to schools] such language be
avoided and the following text be used. 'This award is made in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the [NCAA]
pertaining to the principles of amateurism [emphasis added], sound
academic standards, and financial aid to student athletes . . . Your
acceptance of the award means that you agree with these principles
and are bound by them.'
BYERS, supra note 59, at 75.
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right to terminate this appointment at any time upon the
occurrence of the following . . . c) unsatisfactory academic
performance by the assistant; d) failure of the assistant to comply
with all University conduct and/or academic regulations; e)
changes in University programs and/or plans which cause
assistant services under this agreement to be no longer needed.326
The BPA found that the portion of this clause "defining
[students] out of employment and thereby taking away
[their collective bargaining] rihts" to be "manifestly an
adhesive contract provision." The provision was thus
deemed void under state law.3 28
C. Remaining States
Because of the absence of past organizing campaigns by
undergraduate and graduate student-employees, relevant
precedent in the remaining thirty-four states is limited.
Most promising may be six states (Alaska, Connecticut,
Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, South Dakota, and
Vermont) where flagship public universities presently
recognize faculty unions, and state laws contain no
exemptions limiting the rights of student-employees.32 9 In at
least a dozen states, collective bargaining with college
athletes may be permissible, but neither faculty nor
326. See Unit Determination No. 4-2011, supra note 321, at 3-4.
327. Id. at 18.
328. Id.
329. Nat'l Ctr. for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Educ. and the
Professions, Directory of Faculty Contracts and Bargaining Agents in
Institutions of Higher Education (2011 ed.). See ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.250(6)
(2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-270(b); 14 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4002(h),
(p) (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 26, § 1022(10)-(11) (2010); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 273-A:1(IX)-(X) (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 902(4)-(5) (2003). South
Dakota's labor law, like lowa's, excludes students "working as part-time
employees twenty hours per week or less." S.D. CODIFIED LAws §3-18-1(3); see §
B.5, supra, at 58-59; cf IOWA CODE § 20.4 (2011) (exempting certain students).
As explained above, this limitation should not pose any hurdle for college
athletes. See § B.5, supra, at 58-59. Faculty at the University of Hawai'i also
have a recognized union, but state law specifically excludes "students" from
those eligible for collective bargaining. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-6(g) (2007)
("The following individuals shall not be included in any appropriate bargaining
unit or be entitled to coverage under this chapter: (14) Inmate, kokua, patient,
ward, or student of a state institution; (15) Student help.").
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graduate student unions have established footholds at
public schools.330
At the other end of the spectrum, thirteen states do not
extend collective bargaining rights to any public
employees.33 ' Several others allow only a narrow class of
public safety employees to unionize.3 3 2 In these jurisdictions,
even the most traditional of employees at public universities
lack collective bargaining rights. College athletes, therefore,
would be legally prohibited from unionizing absent some
change in state law.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
A. A Promising Game-Plan for Student-Athletes
However clear existing state labor statutes and board
precedent may be, it would undeniably take some degree of
courage for a state labor board to recognize college athletes
as "employees." The systemic uncertainty that would
necessarily attach to such a ruling, and the reaction it
might provoke from the NCAA, alumni, and state
legislatures would loom heavily over such deliberations. Yet
arguments against recognizing a college players' union
based on such concerns run contrary to the fundamental
objectives of collective bargaining law: anticipated
retaliatory acts by a private third-party have little place in
legal determinations of who is, and who is not, entitled to
statutory protections. And courageous states have long
served as laboratories for "novel social and economic
330. Those states include Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland,
Missouri, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, West Virginia,
and Wyoming.
331. See The Haves and the Have-Nots: How American Labor Law Denies a
Quarter of the Workforce Collective Bargaining Rights, AMERICAN RIGHTS AT
WORK, 11, http://www.americanrightsatwork.org, (citing Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and Utah). Wisconsin also recently enacted
legislation that technically still permits public-sector unions, but sharply limits
the scope of collective bargaining. See Monica Davey, Wisconsin Senate Limits
Bargaining by Public Workers, N.Y. TimEs, Mar. 9, 2011, at Al.
332. JoN 0. SIMABUKURO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40738, THE PUBLIC
SAFETY EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE COOPERATION ACT, 8-10 (providing table compiling
all state collective bargaining laws).
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experiments" in American history.33 3 State labor law, with
its ability to incubate new ideas and its historic sympathy
for student-employees, represents the most promising
vehicle for such an experiment to occur in college sports.
Indeed, as the experience of academic student-
employees has demonstrated, exemption from the National
Labor Relations Act is likely to be a boon (not an obstacle)
for college athletes at public universities. Whereas teaching
assistants and research assistants at private universities
continue to struggle for recognition under the NLRA,3 34
many of their counterparts at public universities have
enjoyed mature collective bargaining relationships for
several decades. State labor law has provided a foothold for
these student-workers, allowing them to make organizing
headway decades before the NLRB even considered
recognizing them as "employees" under federal labor law.335
Much of this success has come as a result of state labor
boards' heightened sensitivity to the new economic realities
of the contemporary university, a point that will be central
for any claims brought by college athletes. In the graduate
assistant context, the move to unionize emerged, at least
333. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
334. See Josh Eidelson, The Fall NLRB Season, AMERICAN PROSPECT, Sept. 6,
2011, http://prospect.orglarticle/fall-nlrb-season; Labor Activists Fear NLRB
Won't Restore Graduate Employees' Union Rights, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC.,
(Dec. 7, 2011, 12:26 PM), http://chronicle.com/blogs/ticker/labor-activists-fear-
nlrb-wont-restore-graduate-employees-union-rights/38910.
335. Indeed, success at the state level may prove a necessary precursor for
subsequent recognition of college athletes before the NLRB. In previous cases
dealing with student-employees, the success of unionization efforts at public
universities has provided important support for expansions of the Act. In Boston
Medical Center, for example, the Board noted that "collective bargaining by
public sector house staff has been permitted and widely practiced," and cited
decisions from ten states recognizing the right of house staff to organize without
any noticeable degradation of educational quality or service to patients. See
Boston Med. Ctr., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 163 (1999); see also Brown Univ., 342
N.L.R.B. 483, 493, 499 (2004) (Liebman, dissenting) ("Collective bargaining by
graduate student employees is increasingly a fact of American university life.
Graduate student unions have been recognized at campuses from coast to coast,
from the State University of New York to the University of California.. . . To be
sure, most [established collective bargaining relationships with students]
involve public universities, but there is nothing fundamentally different
between collective bargaining in public-sector and private-sector universities.").
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partially, "as a backlash against higher education trends ...
where universities have increasingly sought to contain costs
and function more like businesses."'3 6 These enormous "sea
changes"-a phenomenon scholars have dubbed "the rise of
the corporate university"-engendered a new reliance on
undercompensated graduate students' labor in the basic
teaching and research functions of university life.337 Just as
these economic imperatives have remade the role of
graduate students within the academy, the skyrocketing
economic stakes of college athletics have transformed the
meaning and importance of today's college athletes' labor.
The rise of the "corporate university" has impacted not just
classroom education, but all aspects of university life,
including (perhaps especially) college athletics. To the
extent that graduate assistants and college athletes can be
considered "employees," it is a result of the same evolving
reorganization of basic economic structure of today's
universities. Time and again, state labor boards have taken
notice of these dynamics, while the NLRB has not.3 38
B. A Union ofAmateurs?
The relative merits of paying college athletes have been
fiercely contested, both in the scholarly and popular presses.
The potential unionization of college athletes is, of course,
closely tied to this debate: a more equitable distribution of
the tremendous revenues college athletics generates would
likely be a primary focus of any collective bargaining. While
it is difficult to speculate what a "market wage" for today's
college athletes might be, one method of estimating is to
imagine an NCAA revenue-sharing agreement like those
negotiated by unions in professional football and basketball.
In both sports, player's associations have salary agreements
336. Neal H. Hutchins & Melissa B. Hutchins, Catching the Union Bug:
Graduate Student Employees and Unionization, 39 GONZAGA L. REV. 105, 126
(2003).
337. See STEAL TiEs UNIVERSITY 4 (Benjamin Johnson et al. eds. 2003).
338. See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 492 ("[But] (clontrary to the dissent,
the 'academic reality" for graduate student assistants has not changed, in
relevant respects, since our decisions over 25 years ago . . . . [Tihe dissent
theorizes how the changing financial and corporate structure of universities
may have give rise to graduate student organizing.").
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that fix total athlete compensation as a percentage of league
and club revenues.33 9 Assuming revenue splits similar to
their professional counterparts, the "market value" of the
average Football Bowl Subdivision football player would be
$121,048 per year; the "market value" of the average
basketball player at those schools would be $265,027 per
year."o At the biggest programs, an equitable revenue split
would entitle college athletes to considerably larger sums.
But the issue of unionization is distinct from the issue
of professionalization, and to illustrate this, we offer a
counterintuitive suggestion: legal recognition of college
athletes as "employees" might actually serve to promote the
values of amateurism. The conceptual difficulty in
reconciling unionization with amateurism stems, in part,
from dueling understandings of what it is that unions
ultimately do.342 On one view, unions' raison d'8tre is to win
monopoly wage gains for their members-a purpose that is
oddly out of place in the context of "amateur" competition.3 43
An alternative approach, however, recasts the debate in
political, rather than strictly economic, terms.3" Per this
339. A ten-year collective bargaining agreement negotiated by the NFL
Players' Association in July 2011 establishes a salary cap giving players "55
percent of national media revenue, 45 percent of NFL Ventures revenues, and
40 percent of local club revenue." Highlights of the Agreement, N.Y. TiMES (July
26, 2011, 12:46 AM), http://fifthdown.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/26/highlights-
of-the-agreement/. The new agreement between the NBA and the NBPA,
finalized in November 2011, creates a 50-50 revenue split, though players may
receive between forty-nine percent and fifty-one percent of league revenues
depending on the league's success. Howard Beck, N.B.A. Reaches Tentative Deal
to Save Season, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2011, at SP4.
340. Huma & Staurowsky, supra note 101 (assuming a 45% revenue split for
college football players and a 50% split for college basketball players).
341. See id. at 16. At the University of Texas, the largest (and most profitable)
football program in the country, the average football player would receive
$513,922 per year; at Duke University, the country's most profitable basketball
program, the "fair market value" of basketball players is estimated at
$1,025,656 per year.
342. See RICHARD FREEMAN AND JAMES MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 19
(1984) (describing dueling "monopoly face" and "collective voice / institutional
response face" conceptions of labor unions).
343. Id.
344. See Bruce E. Kaufman, The Early Institutionalists on Industrial
Democracy and Union Democracy, 21 J. LAB. RES. 189, 206 (2000).
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"industrial democracy" understanding of collective
bargaining, the role of the union "is to democratize the
employment relationship by balancing power, providing
employees a voice in the determination of the terms and
conditions of employment, and insuring that due process of
law is followed in [the workplace context]."
These values of democratic participation, voice, and fair
play are not just consistent with the traditional view of
amateurism, they lie at its very core. The NCAA itself
acknowledges as much, professing its commitment to the
basic principles that college athletes should be "involve[d] . .
. in matters that affect their lives," and that athletic
competition should remain "an avocation" for students."6
Such "player-centered" values are at "the heart of the
amateur ideal," which traditionally contemplated athletic
competition "organized by and for the recreation of the
players themselves."3 47 Yet in practice, the NCAA's
governance structure almost entirely divests athletes of the
ability to participate in decisions, both large and small,
that dictate their existence.3 49 Unionization presents a
vehicle for challenging this fundamental power imbalance.
What might an NCAA with an institutionalized college
athlete "voice" at the bargaining table look like? Aside from
strictly economic demands, players could seek reductions in
workload, like limits on the number of games played during
345. Id.
346. NCAA DIIsoN I MANUAL, supra note 5, arts. 2.2.6, 2.9, at 4.
347. SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 41, at 14.
348. See, e.g., NCAA Division I Proposal 2011-78 (Aug. 1, 2012), amending
NCAA Bylaw 16.5.2(h) to allow college athletes to receive "bagel spreads [e.g.,
butter, peanut butter, jelly, cream cheese]" in conjunction with the bagels they
are already permitted to receive from their schools.
349. The NCAA has established a "Student-Athlete Advisory Committee"
consisting of students "selected by the Administration Cabinet from a pool of
three nominees from each of the represented conferences." The Student-Athlete
Advisory Committee then designates a single student who is allowed to attend
meetings of the Leadership Council and Legislative Council, each made up of 31
members, but only "in an advisory capacity." The Leadership Council and
Legislative Council report, in turn, to an 18-member Board of Directors, which
again contains no students. NCAA DIVIsIoN I MANUAL, supra note 5, art. 21.7.6
at 337; id. Figure 4-1, Division I Governance Structure, at 26.
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the season (particularly during exam periods),35 0 additional
time off during the holidays,3 5 ' or stricter enforcement of the
NCAA's "20-hour limit" rule.35 2 Collective bargaining
agreements today generally contain "just cause" discipline
provisions, and a union of college athletes could negotiate
stronger procedural safeguards for students navigating the
NCAA's byzantine justice system.5 Or a union might press
for the mandatory use of four-year scholarship offers, which
would give students greater security in planning their
academic futures.35 4 Each of these reforms would further
college athletes' interests as amateurs-helping insulate
students from the pressures wrought by NCAA-driven
commercialization-but are unlikely to be secured absent
the sort of concerted pressure a union could bring to bear.
A recognized union of college athletes could also
promote the health and safety interests of its members-
again without offending NCAA regulations-a particularly
salient issue given the recent attention on the effects of
head injuries in competitive sports.3 55 In the past decade,
350. Cf. Steve Wieberg, Division II schools cut back on length of seasons,
practice time, USA TODAY (Jan. 16, 2010, 7:32 PM), http://www.usatoday.
com/sports/college/2010-01-16-division-II-convention voteN.htm (noting
Division II schools' rejection of "the excesses of bigger-time Division I").
351. See McCormick & McCormick, Myth, supra note 22, at 107 ("The holiday
season revolves around basketball. Indeed, for one player, Thanksgiving dinner
is at the coach's house.. .. In all cases, players play in tournaments during the
holidays, some at very long distances from home. Players have little time to
spend with family during the holidays and are assured only two days off,
Christmas Day and New Year's Day. During this holiday period, when they are
not competing, players are required to lift weights in the morning and practice
in the afternoon for two hours, followed by film sessions and meetings.").
352. See NCAA DIvIsIoN I MANUAL, supra note 5, art. 17.1.6, at 216.
353. See, e.g., Joe Nocera, N. C.A.A.'s 'Justice' System, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2012,
at A21 (criticizing NCAA investigation procedures); see also Joe Nocera, More
N.C.A.A. 'Justice,' N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2012, at A21.
354. See SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 41, at 83-84.
355. See, e.g., Thanh Tan, State Tries to Reduce Head Injuries in a Rough
Game, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2011, at A27A (discussing "new rules passed by the
[Texas] Legislature to protect student athletes from concussion injuries"). In
professional football, the NFL Player's Association has assumed an active role in
ensuring that athletes suffering head injuries receive proper medical care. See,
e.g., Adam Schefter, Union visits Browns to probe staffs, ESPN (Dec. 12, 2011),
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/7345282/nflpa-sent-reps-investigate-cleveland-
browns-colt-mccoy-handling.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
twenty-one student-athletes have suffered sports-related
deaths. and many more have been seriously injured.3 56
Under NCAA rules, universities have no obligation to
provide medical coverage for such injuries. Individuals
incurring catastrophic injuries during practices or games
are sometimes left shouldering the long-term economic
burden of their injuries on their own.357 Unionization would
provide players with a greater voice to advocate for health
and safety reforms, including comprehensive medical
coverage, and could allow students a participatory role in
ensuring compliance with negotiated standards.
Of course, a union built around an "industrial
democracy" model might still bargain for additional
economic benefits, but a negotiated compensation scheme
could still preserve some version of amateur values. For
example, a player's union could demand that a percentage
of television revenues be set aside for college athletes
payable upon graduation. Students struggling with their
academic responsibilities would be permitted to withdraw
from competition for a year, receive a partial early
disbursement to replace their athletic scholarship, and
apply that money toward tuition. The graduation award
would constitute a form of payment, of course, but it would
create strong incentives for college athletes to reprioritize
academics, and would delay placing unrestricted cash in
students' hands.
Alternatively, a union might drop salary demands, but
negotiate for the right of players to sign their own
commercial endorsement deals, either individually or
collectively (as teams).3 58 College athletes are already
subject to such agreements, but only coaches and
universities presently receive the profits." Just as olympic
athletes are now permitted to sign individual endorsement
356. Dennis Dodd, Offseason workouts need changes before the next funeral,
CBSSPORTS.COM (Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/
story/14604719/offseason-workouts-need-changes-before-the-next-funeral.
357. See BRANCH, supra note 49, at 33-36 (discussing case of Kent Waldrep,
permanently paralyzed during a TCU football game).
358. For other proposals, see, e.g., Huma & Staurowsky, supra note 101, at 26
(recommending "lift[ing] restrictions on all college athletes' commercial
opportunities by allowing the Olympic amateur model"); BRANCH, supra note 49,
at 53-57 (same).
359. See supra notes 40-126 and accompanying text.
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deals, college athletes could negotiate for the right to benefit
from their celebrity without unduly tarnishing their status
as amateurs.3 6
Finally, collective bargaining would endow universities
with an ancillary benefit: potential insulation from antitrust
litigation. In recent years, several lawsuits have claimed
that NCAA practices-including the rule capping grants-in-
aid at the cost of attendance-constitute unlawful restraints
on commercial activity.3 6 ' If such litigation proves
successful-a prospect made more plausible now that
schools are considering paying athletes limited cash
stipends-universities could be legally obligated to compete
with one another on an open market to lure promising
talent.36 2 By agreeing to such stipend restrictions in the
context of collective bargaining, however, universities would
be shielded under the non-statutory labor exemption from
antitrust laws.3 63 Such an exemption could allow
universities to maintain relatively modest stipend levels
and thereby preserve the non-professional character of
college sports. Ironically, recognizing college athletes as
"employees" may be the best (or only) way for universities to
avoid paying the exorbitant market salaries the NCAA fears
most.
C. Conclusion: Taking a Step Back
In emphasizing the legal status of college athletes under
presently existing law, this Article admittedly presents a
360. See id. at 53-57.
361. In 2008, the NCAA reached a major settlement-agreeing to make $10
million available to former athletes and over $200 million in educational
support to present and future athletes, without admitting liability-in an
antitrust challenge to scholarship limits. Thomas A Baker III et al., White v.
NCAA- A Chink in the Antitrust Armor, 21 J. LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPORT 75, 77
(2011); Jeffrey J.R. Sundram, Comment, The Downside of Success: How
Increased Commercialism Could Cost the NCAA Its Biggest Antitrust Defense, 85
TuL. L. REV. 543, 550-56 (2010) (discussing the difficulty courts have in
evaluating the NCAA with respect to the Sherman AntiTrust Act).
362. See supra Part I.C.
363. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 235 (1996) (holding non-
statutory labor exemption for NFL remains during bargaining impasse). This
judicially-fashioned exception to the Sherman Act is what allows professional
sports teams to negotiate "salary caps" with player's unions.
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narrow vision of how labor law traditionally operates in
America. In most of the states discussed in Part III,
students organized and agitated (and often went on strike)
prior to having any formal protection from or recognition
under state law. Labor law did not expand on its own
accord, nor did labor boards "come to recognize" student-
workers simply by way of analogy and disinterested reason.
Rather, recognition of graduate students' "employee" status
came in response to the threat of disorderly labor relations
with an organized and economically powerful group. The
extent to which college athletes' organizing efforts pose a
credible economic threat-like the averted 1995 wildcat
strike during March Madness, or the recent organizing
successes of the National College Players Association-may
ultimately dictate whether the law regards their activity as
a cognizable category of labor.
Equally as important is the growing social recognition
that big-time college athletes are, in some basic sense, a
type of worker. As labor law scholars have argued, along the
historical arc of American labor relations, "the courts, the
legislature, and the law have often lagged behind the
general zeitgeist."" Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Taylor
Branch's monumental expose of the NCAA in The Atlantic
in October 2011-which characterized the paternalism and
exploitation inherent in the refusal to pay college athletes
as a form of "colonialism"-is significant in this regard.3 65
So, too, is the January 2012 proposal in the New York
Times's Sunday Magazine to "start paying college athletes,"
a plan that included support for collegiate collective
bargaining.6 Even top coaches have jumped on the
bandwagon. For example, South Carolina football coach
Steve Spurrier, with the backing of six other SEC coaches,
recently proposed that coaches be allowed to pay players
from their own salaries: "We need to get more [money] to
our players . . . . They bring in the money. They're the
364. Benjamin Levin, Blue-Collar Crime: Conspiracy, Organized Labor, and
the Anti-Union Civil RICO Claim, 75 ALBANY L. REV. 559 (2012) (discussing
conspiracy doctrines as lens for exploring historical intersection of legal and
cultural conceptions of unionism).
365. See BRANCH, supra note 49, 12-15.
366. See Nocera, Here's How to Pay Up Now, supra note 18, at 33.
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performers."36 7 The popular recognition of big-time college
athletes as employees is already well underway.
The basic problems at the root of this Article-what
does it mean "to labor" and who do we recognize as
"workers"?-are hardly confined to the sphere of labor law.
In other disciplines-from history to sociology to cultural
studies-"the broader theoretical and social understandings
of what constitutes 'work' have also been thorough v
challenged and profoundly troubled" in recent decades.'
These interventions have increasingly looked beyond waged
productive labor (the centerpiece of past scholarship on
"work"), emphasizing instead themes of dispossession and
expropriation,36 emotional labor,370 "immaterial" labor,3 7 1 or
other categories of activity omitted from traditional "labor
history's gaze."37 2 Alongside this vast and probing literature,
367. Dave Zirin, Saluting a Sick System: 'Sports Illustrated' Honors Duke
Coach Mike Krzyzewski, THE NATION (Dec. 5, 2011, 3:07 PM),
http://www.thenation.com/blog/164975/saluting-sick-system-sports-illustrated-
honors-duke-coach-mike-krzyzewski; Andy Staples, Spurrier wants to give
players money ... from his own pocket, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (June 1, 2011, 5:53
PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/writers/andy-staples/06/010steve-
spurrier-players-stipendlindex.html. Recently, Spurrier proposed paying players
$3500-$4000 per year, more than the $2000 stipend that the NCAA approved in
2011. See Spurrier wants college players to earn as much as $4,000 a year,
CBSSPORTS.COM (May 31, 2012, 12:48 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/
collegefootball/story/19216265/spurrier-wants-college-players-to-eam-as-much-
as-4000-a-year.
368. Zachary Schwartz-Weinstein, The Limits of Work and the Subject of
Labor History, in RETHINKING U.S. LABOR HISTORY: ESSAYS ON THE WORKING-
CLASS EXPERIENCE, 1756-2009, 289, 289 (Donna T. Haverty-Stacke & Daniel J.
Walkowitz eds., 2010).
369. Michael Denning, Wageless Life, 66 NEw LEFT REv. 79, 81 ("You don't
need a job to be a proletarian: wageless life, not wage labour, is the starting
point in understanding the free market.").
370. ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART: COMMERCIALIZATION
OF HUMAN FEELING 147-53 (1985).
371. MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, MULTITUDE: WAR AND DEMOCRACY IN
THE AGE OF EMPIRE 108 (2004) ("[Ilndustrial labor [has] lost its hegemony and in
its stead [has] emerged 'immaterial labor,' that is, labor that creates immaterial
products, such as knowledge, information, communication, a relationship, or an
emotional response.").
372. Schwartz-Weinstein, supra note 368, at 289. Further, "Labor historians
could and should continue to document the 'laboring' of particular activities and
groups, the way particular activities have become recognizable as work and
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American labor law's reliance on anachronistic formulas for
delineating who constitutes an "employee" seems shallow,
at best.
Yet despite these shortcomings, labor law has
articulated theoretical frameworks (in certain jurisdictions,
at least) that would likely encompass college athletes as
"employees." In at least a dozen states, we believe college
athletes would be among those individuals entitled to
certain basic statutory protections, should they collectively
undertake to alter the conditions under which they labor.
Recognizing that college athletes who perform on the college
gridiron or basketball court are both students and workers
is not just descriptively honest, but in the final analysis, the
fair thing to do. Those whose talents and efforts generate
millions of dollars for others are entitled to basic collective
rights with respect to the labor they provide.
labor, and how the subjects who perform it have become knowable as 'workers,'
both within and outside of wage labor." Id. at 290.
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